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Abstract  

The aim of this dissertation is measuring economic and social mobility in South Africa. The work from this thesis 
shows that various problems with survey responses can produce misleading impressions of the South African 
labour market and of income dynamics. This highlights the importance of measuring variables of interest 
accurately and to carefully consider the ways in which unreliable responses can bias the results of conventional 
estimators. It will be demonstrated that even the most appropriate estimator and identification strategy can fail 
to yield unbiased estimates if important measurement issues are ignored. To address these shortcomings this 
thesis applies and adapts new approaches to remedy well-known survey data reliability concerns. The most 
important findings of the three chapters are as follows: 
First, in the context of high unemployment and weak labour market attachment for many South African youth, 
the formulation of survey questions matters and approaches commonly used to elicit reliable responses in 
developed countries cannot be assumed to work equally well. This is particularly true for subjective measures. 
Hence, answers to the traditional question on reservation wages may fail to provide meaningful answers. It 
appears that different formulations and ordering of the reservation wage question can trigger different cognitive 
processes in the respondent that elicit different answers. However, using a series of questions intended to elicit a 
more accurate response, the new reservation wage measure seems to be more internally consistent and the 
regression results to be in line with labour market search models. 
Second, this thesis shows that estimating the speed of convergence between the poorest and richest households 
using micro growth regressions without controlling for measurement error would overestimate income mobility 
significantly. Therefore, a newly developed GMM estimator was applied to four large national panel studies to 
obtain less biased β estimates. The findings of four large representative national panel studies from the USA, 
South Africa, Chile and Tanzania show that naïve OLS regression coefficients would overestimate the extent of 
income mobility by a factor of about 4-6. The hypothesis of no measurement error can be rejected for all the 
countries observed. While the data reliability for the US, Chile and Tanzania correspond to their levels of 
economic development, South Africa’s data reliability appears to be unexpectedly high. The nonparametric 
estimates also show that the speed of convergence varies over the income distribution and that income is more 
reliably captured for richer than for poorer households.  
Third, the relative importance of family, neighbourhood and school quality in explaining variation in socio-
economic outcomes are evaluated. Using spatial merging techniques to combine different data sets, new school 
wealth quintiles have been created that predict individual learner and school outcomes more accurately than the 
old school quintiles. This chapter provides evidence of the importance of quality education in explaining 
university enrolment. In addition, there seem to be a significant premium for quality education in labour markets 
earnings regressions, which confirms the long-term importance of schooling. 
. 
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Abstrak 
Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die ekonomiese en sosiale mobiliteit in Suid-Afrika te meet. Die werk wat 
gedoen is, toon dat verskeie probleme met opname-response tot 'n wanindruk oor die Suid-Afrikaanse 
arbeidsmark en inkomste-dinamiek kan lei. Dit beklemtoon hoe belangrik dit is om die veranderlikes van belang 
akkuraat te meet, en om die maniere waarop onbetroubare response die uitkomste van konvensionele beramers 
kan beïnvloed, versigtig te oorweeg. Daar sal geïllustreer word dat selfs die mees toepaslike beraming- en 
identifikasiestrategie tot bevooroordeelde beramings kan lei wanneer belangrike metingskwessies verontagsaam 
word. Ten einde hierdie tekortkominge te bowe te kom, word nuwe en aangepaste benaderings in die studie 
gebruik om bekende betroubaarheidskwessies rakende opname-data uit die weg te ruim. Die belangrikste 
bevindinge van die drie hoofstukke is soos volg: 
Eerstens, in 'n omgewing waar baie Suid-Afrikaanse jongmense onderhewig is aan 'n hoë voorkoms van 
werkloosheid en swak koppeling aan die arbeidsmark, maak die formulering van opname-vrae saak. Daar kan nie 
aanvaar word dat metodes wat algemeen gebruik word om betroubare response in ontwikkelde lande te verkry, 
net so doeltreffend sal wees nie, veral in die geval van subjektiewe maatstawwe. Antwoorde op die tradisonele 
vraag oor reserwelone kan dus niksseggend wees. Dit kom voor asof die vraag, wanneer dit anders geformuleer 
of georganiseer word, aanleiding gee tot ander kognitiewe prosesse in die respondent, wat ander antwoorde 
ontlok. Deur 'n reeks vrae te gebruik wat daarop gemik is om 'n meer akkurate respons uit te lok, is die nuwe 
maatstaf vir reserwelone op die oog af intern meer konsekwent en die regressie-resultate in ooreenstemming met 
werksoekmodelle. 
Tweedens wys hierdie tesis dat inkomstemobiliteit aansienlik oorskat word by die beraming van 
konvergensiespoed tussen die armste en rykste huishoudings indien mikro-groeiregressies gebruik word sonder 
om metingsfoute in ag te neem. 'n Nuwe GMM-beramer is derhalwe op vier groot, nasionale paneelstudies 
toegepas om minder bevooroordeelde -beramings te kry. Die bevindinge van vier groot, verteenwoordigende 
paneelstudies in die VSA, Suid-Afrika, Chili en Tanzaniё toon dat naïewe OLS- (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regressie-koëffisiënte die mate van inkomstemobiliteit met 'n faktor van 4-6 oorskat. Die hipotese van geen 
metingsfoute kan verwerp word in die geval van al die betrokke lande. Terwyl die betroubaarheid van die data in 
die geval van die VSA, Chili en Tanzaniё ooreenstem met die vlak van hul ekonomiese ontwikkeling, lyk die data-
betroubaarheid van Suid-Afrika onverwags hoog. Die nie-parametriese beramings wys ook dat die 
konvergensiespoed met betrekking tot die inkomsteverspreiding wissel, en dat inkomste meer betroubaar 
weergegee word by ryker as by armer huishoudings. 
Derdens word die relatiewe belangrikheid van die gesin, die woonbuurt en die kwaliteit van die skool geёvalueer 
ten einde variasies in sosio-ekonomiese uitkomste te verklaar. Deur ruimtelike samesmeltingstegnieke te gebruik 
om verskilende datastelle te kombineer, is nuwe welvaartskwintiele vir skole geskep. Hierdie nuwe kwintiele 
voorspel individuele leerder- en skooluitkomste akkurater as die ou skoolkwintiele. Die bewys van hoe belangrik 
kwaliteitonderrig is, word verskaf wanneer universiteitsinskrywings verduidelik word. Dit kom boonop voor asof 
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kwaliteitonderwys in arbeidsmarkte met verdienstefunksies sterk in aanvraag is. Dit bevestig die langtermyn 
belangrikheid van onderwys. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and research question 
 
South Africa is an extraordinarily unequal country. The richest 10% of the population own 90-95% of the 
assets and earn 55-60% of all income (Orthofer, 2016), which is higher than in any other country for which 
comparable data exists. Even though legalised racial discrimination ended with political transition in 1994, 
the distributions of wealth and income continue to be highly dependent on race. Moreover, the place of 
birth and the socio-economic status of parents remain a strong predictor of a child’s probability of 
completing or continuing beyond secondary education (WB, 2012; Zoch, 2015). A relatively small decrease 
in inequality between races since the end of apartheid has coincided with rising inequality within the racial 
groups (Leibbrandt et al., 2011). Despite the positive indication that wealth and poverty are being distributed 
less along racial lines and that a new affluent black elite and middle class have emerged, poor black 
households are falling behind in relative terms. Against this backdrop of high inequality and persistent racial 
bias, this dissertation investigates different aspects of social and economic mobility with an emphasis on 
reliable measurement using survey data. It will demonstrate that various well-known problems with survey 
responses can produce a misleading impression of the South African labour market and income dynamics. 
Explicitly addressing these shortcomings can supply more reliable results that challenge previous findings 
and have important policy implications. This is achieved by introducing new approaches to analyse existing 
panel data and survey data linked using spatial merging techniques. 
This chief scientific contribution of this research is to the literature on measurement error in survey data 
and how this affects our ability to obtain reliable estimates (e.g. Bound and Krueger, 1991; Bound et al., 
2001; Akee, 2011; and Glewwe, 2012). On the basis of three chapters on social- and economic mobility, it 
examines the importance of measuring variables of interest accurately and carefully considering the ways in 
which unreliable responses can bias the results of conventional estimators. The dissertation will demonstrate 
that even the most appropriate estimator and identification strategy will sometimes fail to yield unbiased 
estimates if important measurement issues are ignored.  
These findings offer a reminder of at least three lessons. First, the formulation of survey questions matters 
and approaches commonly used to elicit reliable responses in developed countries cannot be assumed to 
work equally well in different developing country contexts. This is particularly true for subjective measures, 
and it is worth exploring whether different question formulations that require different cognitive processes 
provide consistent responses. Second, the effect of measurement error is well-documented to be 
exacerbated in panel data estimators that study the changes in variables between successive waves, but this 
fact is often stated without carefully exploring the magnitude of the resulting bias. This dissertation shows 
that the bias can be severe under certain circumstances, and lead to very misleading estimates. Third, 
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omitting variables that are difficult to observe but highly correlated to observable variables of interest, results 
in the well-known omitted variable bias. Using additional data sources to construct proxy variables will help 
alleviate this bias, and can provide a much more accurate understanding of the causal channels that 
determine outcomes. 
The three thesis chapters that follow investigate how survey reliability concerns can affect the measurement 
of social- and economic mobility. Chapter 2, the first substantive chapter, explores how reliable self-reported 
reservation wages are. Chapter 3 estimates income mobility in a cross country comparison. The fourth 
Chapter estimates the effect of neighbourhoods and school quality on education outcomes and earnings. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter first gives some background to the South African economy in 
order to contextualise this dissertation and to demonstrate the relevance of the three research chapters. 
Thereafter, for each chapter the methodology, general findings and policy implications will be shorty 
discussed. 
 
1.1. Context 
While the South African economy has experienced modest GDP growth for the last two decades, around 
3.4 percent per annum since 1995 (WB, 2012), it is evident that economic growth was not fast enough to 
create enough jobs for the increased labour supply after the fall of apartheid. As a consequence 
unemployment (by the broad definition) rose from 31% in 1995 to 42% in 2003 and was about 36% in 2007 
(Burger et al., 2015). Besides structural and institutional reasons, unemployment also increased due to the 
mismatch of mostly unskilled worker supply and demand for high-skill labour (Banerjee et al. 2008). Branson 
and Wittenberg (2007) concludes that the recent generation of young labour work participants are better 
qualified and left school at an earlier age than their parents’ generation. Nevertheless, South African youth 
unemployment rate for 2005 was about 50% for the cohort aged 15-24 which is much higher than in other 
comparable sub-Saharan countries (Rankin and Roberts, 2011). One explanation for this phenomenon could 
be household formation, where the unemployed may migrate and attach themselves to households with 
some kind of employment income or state transfers (Klasen and Woolard, 2009). In particular, social grants 
that are significantly higher than in other sub-Saharan countries and could increase the reservation wage and 
lower labour force participation (Leibbrandt et al., 2011; Abel, 2013). Similarly, high expectations following 
the political transformation could have led to unrealistically high perception of wage possibilities in South 
Africa and further increase the reservation wage of the youth (Banerjee et al. 2008). Interestingly previous 
studies that have looked at the direct effect of reservation wages on employment probability haven’t found 
any adverse effects (Kingdon and Knight, 2001; Nattrass and Walker, 2005). Hence, chapter 2 will 
reconsider whether reservation wage can explain labour market behaviour if measured more precisely.  
While school to work transition is a key element in understanding who is getting ahead and who is falling 
behind, chapters 3 and 4 will deal more directly with the concept of social- and economic mobility. As 
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mentioned before, South Africa is one of the most unequal societies in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 
0.70 in 2008 (WB, 2012). There are many different reasons for this situation. Yet, at the heart of the 
inequality lies the rising inequality within the labour market, both due to the increase in unemployment as 
well as rising earnings inequality. This again can be attributed to the above mentioned mismatch between 
low skill labour supply and high skill labour demand, which is partly caused by the failure of the education 
system to provide students from low socio-economic status with quality education (Van der Berg, 2007, 
2009). In this context, chapter 3 will measure how income mobile South African households are. As upward 
economic mobility continues to be one of the most important indicators for economic development, the 
chapter sets out to estimate the true speed of convergence between the poorest and richest household after 
controlling for measurement error in self-reported per capita household income.  
A key feature of the apartheid regime was that non-whites were restricted in the location they were allowed 
to live in as well as limited in their access to affordable schooling. This segregation between races has seen 
long-lasting impacts that can still be observed in today’s distribution of neighbourhoods, travel costs to 
central formal jobs and education outcomes (e.g. Van der Berg, 2007, 2009; Lam et al. 2011). Yet, not much 
is known about the direct effect of spatial location and the relative importance of family, neighbourhood 
and the school children are attending (Altonji and Mansfield, 2011; Jenning et al., 2015). Specifically, no 
existing empirical studies have attempted to distinguish between the effects of residential neighbourhoods 
or family background. However, the answer to this question is important for at least two reasons. First, 
there are important policy implications of knowing whether it is the school or the family background which 
is determining education outcomes. If parents’ social economic status is only significant because it is 
predicting the quality of the school their offspring go to, improving the school quality will have large effects, 
in particular for the poorest students. Second, in the light of South African inequality problem, knowing 
how much neighbourhood and school quality will determine a child’s chances of reaching matric, enrolling 
into university and their future earnings is an important step to reduce the inequality gap of future 
generations and making South Africa a more fair society. 
 
1.2. How reliable are self-reported reservation wages? 
Chapter 2 demonstrates how different formulations of the same survey question can trigger different 
cognitive processes in the respondent that elicit different answers. This is in consistent with findings in the 
behavioural literature that answers to subjective questions can be influenced by a multitude of seemingly 
irrelevant factors (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In particular respondents that have little experience 
thinking about a question may provide less reliable information, unless the question is specifically formulated 
to require a thoughtful response. Given the enormous problem of youth unemployment in South Africa, 
estimating labour market behaviour and understanding the school to work transition is of the utmost 
importance. However, answers to the traditional question on reservation wages may fail to provide 
meaningful answers if the youth have a very weak attachment to the labour market and are not used to 
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scrutinising their preferences to determine their lowest acceptable wage. This issue will be revisited using a 
series of questions in the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) of South Africa, which was intended to elicit a 
more accurate response to the lowest wage an individual will accept. It can be shown that the more reliable 
reservation wage measures behaves according to labour market theory and influence labour market 
outcomes. The new measure evolves over time in a way that is consistent with workers updating their beliefs 
regarding the wage offer distribution (i.e. learning), whereas the traditional measure does not. In addition, a 
simple model of employment probability shows that the new measure can predict the likelihood of finding 
employment or remaining employed, but the traditional measure cannot. This implies that South African 
youth indeed are waiting out for well paid jobs. This is in line with the findings by Rankin and Roberts 
(2011) showing that there is an over-demand for jobs at large formal companies, which are the only ones 
that can fulfil the overoptimistic wage aspirations of most workers. More generally, the chapter provides 
new evidence how economic models and research results can be influenced by noisy data due to respondent 
misperceptions and unreliable self-reports. It highlights the importance for economists to carefully design 
survey questions so that individuals give reliable answers that are not influenced by a variety of cognitive 
and non-cognitive factors. 
 
1.3. Estimating income mobility  
Chapter 3 studies the extent of economic mobility by estimating the speed of convergence between the 
poorest and richest households using micro growth regressions and a three wave panel data set. It is well-
established that measurement error in household income can cause income to appear more mobile than is 
actually the case (Antman and Mckenzie, 2007a). This is particularly problematic in developing countries 
where household consumption and income data from household surveys can be noisy (Fields, 2008a). 
Hence, controlling for such measurement error, Antman and McKenzie (2007a) show that the naïve OLS 
estimates would overestimate mobility in Mexico by about 33%, while Glewwe (2012) finds that between 
15 to 42% of estimated Vietnamese economic mobility is due to measurement error. In an attempt to build 
on such studies, chapter 3 applies a newly developed GMM estimator to four large panel datasets from 
different developing countries and the USA, each containing three waves of household income data. This 
method aims to quantify the effect of household income measurement error when estimating economic 
mobility with micro growth regressions. This approach is more efficient than the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimator and allows testing the validity of the underlying identifying assumptions. The cross-country 
comparison is particularly interesting since it compares the speed of convergence in South Africa to other 
developing countries. Furthermore, applying the method to the USA will allow the juxtaposition of the data 
reliability estimated from the GMM estimator to that obtained from validation studies in the USA. The 
findings show that naïve OLS regression coefficients overestimate the extent of income mobility for all four 
countries. The GMM estimates of the expected half-life of income gaps for the US are consistent with 
estimates from the intergenerational literature which are less vulnerable to measurement error. The results 
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provide support for the assumption that the GMM estimator produces realistic estimates for the speed of 
convergence within a country. The findings from all countries strongly indicate the presence of 
measurement error, in particular, for Chile and Tanzania. The nonparametric estimates also show that the 
speed of convergence varies over the income distribution and that income is more reliably captured for 
richer than for poorer households. In general, the results of this chapter indicate that income mobility can 
be seriously overestimated when not accounting for measurement error. This is important for economists 
and policy makers that attempt to estimate whether the gap between the poorest and richest households is 
closing over time and how long it will take for the society to become more equal. 
 
1.4. The effect of neighbourhoods and school quality on education and 
labour market outcomes 
Finally, Chapter 4 adds to the literature on how neighbourhood and school quality affects education and 
labour market outcomes. Previous studies that analysed the relative importance of family background, 
neighbourhood and school effects in the US and Northern Europe, mostly found only small neighbourhood 
or school effects (e.g. Raaum et al., 2006; Lindahl, 2011; Nicoletti and Rabe, 2013; and Schnitzlein, 2014). 
However, as argued by Case and Yogo (1999), location and schooling quality should matter more in 
countries like South Africa, where movement was restricted and resources were distributed unevenly 
between race groups. This study adds to the literature, by using a spatial approach to link a neighbourhood 
wealth index from the Census 2011 community survey to the household and school information from the 
National Income Dynamics Study. The more informative school wealth quintiles estimates, prove to be 
good proxies for school quality and have a higher predictive power in explaining schooling outcomes than 
existing measures of school quintiles, at least in the metro regions of South Africa. The analysis proceeds to 
show large differences in education outcomes depending on where a student attends school, which is mostly 
dependent on socio- economic status. However, this study also demonstrates that even children from the 
poorest neighbourhood would perform well if they go to one of the richest 20% of schools. Yet, given the 
limited number of quality schools, the segregated location of quality schools, financial as well as transport 
constraints, only about 10% of children the poorest 60% actually attend a top quintile schools. In order to 
achieve more equal education outcomes, the quality of schools in the poor neighbourhoods would need to 
be very considerably improved. The chapter also provides evidence that the benefits of improved school 
quality include an improved likelihood of tertiary enrolment. In addition, previous attempts to identify the 
effect of school quality on labour market wages have been confounded by using available but less 
informative quality measures like cognitive ability tests (du Rand et al., 2011; van der Berg et al., 2011). 
However, using the new school wealth index as an instrument for school quality, there seems to be a 
significant premium for quality education in labour markets earnings regressions, which show the long-term 
implications of the schooling system.  
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Chapter 2:  
How reliable are self-reported reservation 
wages? 
Evidence from South Africa 

2.1. Introduction 
Standard search theory posits that reservation wages have an effect on both the duration of unemployment 
and the realized wage distribution (Mortensen, 1976, 1986; Pissarides, 2000). As a consequence, a host of 
empirical studies in labour economics have investigated the determinants of the reservation wage, its 
behaviour over spells of unemployment, and the effect of high reservation wages on key labour market 
outcomes (Lancaster, 1985; Jones 1988; Shimer and Werning, 2007; Addison et al., 2010, 2013; Brown and 
Taylor, 2011). 
Empirical research on reservation wages largely relies on data from survey questions where individuals are 
asked to report the lowest wage they would work for.1 Answers to subjective questions are influenced by a 
variety of cognitive and non-cognitive factors (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). According to Kingdon 
and Knight (2001), individuals may provide unreliable answers on reservation wages for three reasons: first, 
they may have limited knowledge about the labour market. Second, respondents may be inclined to report 
their expected wages rather than the ‘lowest wage they would accept’. Third, individuals may imagine 
themselves in a bargaining context when asked to state their reservation wage and therefore report higher 
values. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) discuss a number of reasons to doubt whether subjective questions 
in general elicit meaningful answers: the wording and ordering of questions, scaling problems and forms of 
social pressure from the interviewer. In addition, attitudes may not "exist" in a coherent way because 
respondents are reluctant to admit lack of attitude or because they misreport their attitude. In most cases, 
the factors (both cognitive and non-cognitive) influencing the answers to subjective questions cannot be 
treated as exogenous. With respect to questions about lowest acceptable wages, this introduces the 
possibility that empirical models in labour economics using self-reported reservation wages – as either a 
dependent or explanatory variable – may suffer from measurement error bias.  
We contribute to the literature on the role and determinants of reservation wages by using a series of survey 
questions on explicit job offers as well as traditional questions on the lowest acceptable wage. Both types of 
 
1 The actual wording of the question varies. Examples are: "What is the lowest amount in take-home pay that you 
would be prepared to accept from a new job?" (Jones, 1988); “If you were offered a job as a -, would you accept it at 
-?”(Holzer, 1986b); “What type of work have you been looking for?” followed by “What would the wage (or salary) 
have to be for you to be willing to take it?” (Holzer, 1986b). 
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questions were asked in the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS) in South Africa (2002-2009) with the view of 
eliciting a more comprehensive picture on the lowest wage respondents would truly accept. Our analysis 
shows that people may systematically misreport their reservation wages when asked in a traditional way and 
that this non-classical measurement error can bias the coefficients of common regression models in 
empirical labour economics. On the other hand, using a “probed” reservation wage from explicit 
hypothetical job offers, we find a significant negative relationship with the length of the unemployment 
spell. Reservation wages decline by about 4.8% per year of unemployment duration, which is in line with 
evidence based on high-quality data from the U.S. (Krueger and Mueller, 2014). We also observe that the 
probed reservation wage is negatively associated with the probability of employment. We find that a 10% 
increase in the reservation wage reduces the likelihood of being employed in the next period by about 0.6%. 
Our findings are in contrast with the evidence from other studies in South Africa based on self-reported 
reservation wages. The empirical analysis in the paper highlights the importance of investigating whether 
(and why) individuals tend to provide noisy reports of their reservation wages. This can prove useful in the 
formulation of appropriate survey questions. In addition, the paper’s results are of relevance for the debate 
on the determinants and effects of reservation wages in high-unemployment (and high-inequality) countries 
like South Africa. 
 
2.2. Theory and Literature review 
According to job search theory, the reservation wage can play an important role in explaining unemployment 
duration and job acceptance. Under the assumption that wage offers are independent realizations from a 
known wage offer distribution and jobs, once accepted, are indefinite, Lancaster and Chesher (1983) show 
that the optimal reservation wage rate  can be written as:  
   	 	
 	   

  dF(w)   (1) 
where the parameter b is the amount of unemployment benefits net of any search costs,  is the wage arrival 
rate,  is the discount rate of future incomes, and w is the wage offer whose cumulative distribution function 
is F(w). The model posits that a wage offer greater than or equal to  is accepted, while a smaller offer is 
declined and the job search continues.  
One of the immediate implications of this basic model is that higher reservation wages will decrease the 
probability of employment in any given period, thus increasing the expected duration of unemployment. 
Lancaster (1985) showed that the empirical relationship between reservation wages and duration of 
unemployment in England is indeed positive. That is, higher reservation wages are associated with longer 
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spells of unemployment.2 Holzer (1986b) finds that differences in reservation wages account for 26 to 42 
percent of the black-white gap in unemployment duration in U.S data. Using data from Europe, Brown and 
Taylor (2013) find that the elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the reservation wage is 
positive and significant. One of the empirical challenges in estimating the relationship between reservation 
wages and employment probabilities is that unobserved characteristics can influence both the job-arrival 
rate and the reservation wage. Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Jensen and Westergård-Nielsen (1987), and 
Addison et al. (2010) all find a significant positive correlation between the offer-rate and the reservation 
wage. For this reason, Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) estimate the probability of transitioning into 
employment in a simultaneous-equation system as a product of the job-offer rate and the acceptance 
probability. Their findings indicate a negative relationship between reservation wage and probability of 
employment. 
If the reservation wage plays an important role in explaining employment outcomes, then understanding 
employment requires knowing what determines reservation wages. Equation (1) shows that unemployment 
benefits should increase the reservation wage, as should family support and individual wealth that generates 
non-labour income. These hypotheses have been tested in a number of empirical studies. Lancaster and 
Chesher (1983), Feldstein and Poterba (1984) and Addison et al. (2009, 2010) show that the elasticity 
between unemployment benefits and both reservation wages and re-employment likelihood is negative and 
significant. Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) show that household wealth and reservation wages are positively 
correlated. 
While the basic model in Equation (1) assumes that reservation wages are constant over the unemployment 
spell, several contributions (e.g. Mortensen, 1977; Lancaster, 1985; and Jones, 1988) point out sources of 
non-stationarity and document a declining trend in reservation wages over the course of joblessness. This 
result has been confirmed in a recent study of 13 countries in the European Community Household Panel 
(EHCP) by Addison et al. (2013). The authors apply an econometric framework similar to Lancaster (1985) 
and find a small but significant negative trend of reservation wages over the unemployment spell. Such a 
trend can be related to a number of factors: the limited duration of unemployment benefits, liquidity-
constrained job search, human capital loss over the spell, initial over-confidence, adverse signalling effects 
of being long-term unemployed, or learning about the job offer distribution and the availability of jobs (e.g. 
Burdett and Vishwanath, 1988; Kriechel and Pfann, 2006; and Krueger and Mueller, 2014). Brown et al. 
(2011) provide evidence of a strong decline in reservation wages over time in a real-time search laboratory 
experiment. They explain their findings by “non-stationary subjective costs”. Using longitudinal data from 
weekly interviews of unemployed workers in New Jersey, Krueger and Mueller (2014) also find a decline in 
reservation wages over the unemployment spell. Interestingly, their results imply a rather small impact of 
 
2 The author uses simultaneous equations models to deal with the reverse causality problem in the relationship 
between unemployment spells and reservation wages. This is because reservation wages are themselves influenced by 
the duration of unemployment. This relationship will be discussed further below. 
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unemployment insurance benefits on reservation wages and a moderate decline of reservation wages over 
the jobless spell. 
2.2.1. Empirical studies in South Africa 
The South African literature on reservation wages is surprisingly limited given the extent of the 
unemployment problem in the country. To our knowledge, only three papers have attempted to estimate 
the direct effect of reservation wages on the likelihood of employment (Kingdon and Knight, 2001; Nattrass 
and Walker, 2005; and Rankin and Roberts, 2011). These studies obtain a prediction of the remuneration 
unemployed respondents could expect given their characteristics and compare it to self-reported reservation 
wages. Using the PSLSD (1993) and the October Household Survey (1994), Kingdon and Knight (2001) 
find that most unemployed respondents have higher reservation wages than their ‘predicted’ wage. The 
authors draw no further conclusions about this relationship as they consider the answers to the reservation 
wage question in the surveys to be unreliable. Nattrass and Walker (2005) use a dataset from Cape Town, 
which was explicitly designed to obtain more reliable reservation wage data, by asking unemployed workers 
in different ways about their “lowest acceptable wage”, “minimum possible wage” and “would you work 
for R33 a day?”. Interestingly they find inconsistencies for many of the answers of the participants and 
conclude that “either people respond differently to slightly different phrasing of questions about the 
reservation wages; or they do not have a definite reservation wage.” Finally, the authors estimate Heckman-
corrected predicted wages and use this information to generate a dummy variable that equals one for 
individuals whose reservation wage was greater than the predicted wage (and zero otherwise). Using this as 
a dependent variable in a probit regression, they find a positive correlation between employment likelihood 
and reservation wages. They conclude that high reservation wages do not result in higher unemployment 
and that workers have realistic wage expectations.  
In a recent study, based on the South African Young Persons Survey (SAYPS), Rankin and Roberts (2011) 
show instead that young labour market participants overestimate their wage possibilities and that reservation 
wages decline until the age of 30 and following first labour market experiences. The authors suggest a 
number of potential factors that could explain high youth reservation wages: transport costs,3 loss of intra-
household transfers, social grants, and hoping for jobs in big rather than small firms. Banerjee et al. (2008) 
suggest that high expectations following the political transformation could have led to unrealistically high 
perception of wage possibilities in South Africa.4 Banerjee et al. (2008) also name a few features of the South 
African institutional context that could bring reservation wages to levels firms are unwilling to pay. First, 
although unemployment benefits are only given to a small proportion of the unemployed, state pensions 
and other government transfers are relatively generous in South Africa (Case and Deaton, 1998). Much 
attention in the literature has been given to the effect of the old age pension (OAP) on labour market 
 
3 In South Africa, many unemployed live in locations far away from potential workplaces. This is one of the legacies 
of Apartheid-era forced removals (Banerjee et al., 2008, 734). 
4 In addition, the introduction of minimum wages in South Africa could have changed the perceptions of fairness. 
Falk et al. (2006) show in laboratory experiments that minimum wages can cause long-lasting changes in subjects’ 
reservation wages even when they are no longer in place. 
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outcomes because of its unique combination of high coverage and value.5 Evaluating the literature on OAP, 
Leibbrandt et al. (2013) conclude that the pensions can have both a positive and a negative labour market 
effect. On the one hand, Abel (2013) argues that the income effect of having an OAP recipient in the 
household leads to an increase in the reservation wage and to a lower probability of employment. This is in 
line with studies like Bertrand et al (2003), Ranchhod (2006) and Sienaert (2008) that find a decrease in 
labour market participation among old age pensioners as well as among working age individuals in pension-
receiving households. The effect seem to be larger when the eligible pensioner is female, as females seem 
to share their income more with the rest of the household (Leibbrandt et al. 2013). On the other hand, Posel 
et al. (2006) find that African women are more likely to become migrant workers after the arrival of a 
pensioner, since the extra income enables them to go for job search. Similarly Ardington et al. (2016) find 
that young men from KwaZulu-Natal are more likely to become labour migrants at least if educated enough. 
However, studies by Klasen and Woolard (2009) and Ardington et al. (2009) show how unemployed family 
members seem to move to households with pensioners and that this can prolong their unemployment 
duration.  
2.2.2. Measurement error 
Reservation wages are difficult to measure in practice. A number of studies acknowledge that self-reports 
from surveys may be biased for a number of reasons (Hofler and Murphy 1994; Böheim, 2002) and may 
not reflect what labour economists are interested in measuring (Petterson, 1997). The first potential source 
of bias is the way the reservation wage question is phrased. Jones (1988) raises the concerns that the question 
might be posed in a way that it is not meaningful to respondents. Hofler and Murphy (1994, p.962) argue 
that respondents often “engage in wishful thinking” and state amounts that are higher than their true limit 
“if confronted with a realistic opportunity”. Petterson (1997, p.607) believes that jobless workers respond 
to such a question in a way that “reflect[s] what they believe they should earn, not necessarily what they can 
earn”. He concludes that reservation wages reflect aspirations and perceptions of self-worth and not the 
wages at which the respondents are indifferent between working or not. In addition, the perception of 
fairness might be a function of the received wage, i.e. low-wage earners are less likely to consider their 
payment as fair than higher-wage earners. This is in line with findings from other studies showing that job-
seekers at the lowest end of the wage distribution report reservation wages that are above their previous 
wage, while those at the top state reservation wages below their previous wages (Holzer, 1986a, 1986b; 
Jones, 1988; Jensen and Westergård-Nielsen, 1987; Petterson, 1997). 
A second source of potential bias is that job characteristics might influence the willingness to accept a job 
offer (Hofler and Murphy, 1994). Whereas British surveys only ask a single question of the form: “What is 
the lowest amount in take-home pay you would be prepared to accept for a new job?”, American studies 
 
5 The OAP paid out 1200 Rand in 2012, which is about 175% of the national median per-capita income, more than 
90% of black South Africans were eligible to receive the grant once they turned 60 years, and 86% of those eligible 
take it up (Abel, 2013). Given that only 7 percent of pensioners live without at least one 19-50 year old household 
member (Sienaert, 2008), the literature has found significant intra-household resource transfers (Ardington et al., 
2009). 
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ask a two-tiered question: (1) “What type of work have you been looking for?” and (2) “What would the 
wage or salary have to be for you to be willing to take employment in this type of work?”. Asking reservation 
wage questions in the latter fashion might partially reduce the job characteristics bias but could also induce 
a different bias if the lowest acceptable wage is below acceptable wages in the desired industry. 
Third, respondents are likely to give different amounts depending on whether the question is framed as 
open-ended or closed. Holzer (1986b) compares the answers from the NBER Survey of Inner-City Black 
Youth with the youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). While the NBER survey asks 
youth whether or not they would accept specific dollar amounts, the NLS asks about the job “sought” and 
to designate their own dollar figure. Comparing the responses with recent job salaries and other job 
questions, Holzer finds that the answers in the NBER survey appear to be more consistent than the one 
from the NLS and that black respondents (especially from the South) exhibit larger inconsistencies. One 
possible explanation is that open-ended reservation wage questions allow individuals to confuse wage 
expectations with the reservation wage. Holzer (1986b, p.43) concludes that blacks are either more likely to 
misinterpret the question than whites or have a “greater degree of expectational error on their part”.  
Finally, an additional source of inaccuracy in reservation wage data is non-response bias. This might be a 
serious concern if individuals who do not respond are a non-random sub-sample (Hofler and Murphy, 
1994). The data collecting process can also bias the findings on reservation wages. Sestito and Viviano (2011) 
observe that self-reported reservation wages are relatively higher in the (poorer) South than in the (richer) 
North of Italy. Their explanation is that the wage distribution of the unemployed sample in their data is 
affected by a double-selection process.6 Another interpretation would be that in structurally poorer regions 
individuals have weaker labour market attachments and therefore provide less reliable responses to open 
questions about their reservation wage as argued before. 
With respect to the direction of measurement error in reservation wages, most studies (e.g. Moylan et al., 
1984; Addison et al., 2004; and Brown and Taylor, 2011) find that reported reservation wages are generally 
higher than accepted wage offers.7 Krueger and Mueller (2014) find that close to half of their sample accepts 
wage offers below their stated reservation wage and suggest that this may be due to errors in self-reports. 
The authors also examine the factors that predict accepting a wage offer below the stated reservation wage 
and find that long-term unemployed (more than 79 weeks), risk-averse and graduate degree holders are 
more likely to accept job offers lower than their stated reservation wage. That is, misreporting of the 
reservation wage is not random. 
 
6 That is, only people who are looking for work are asked to report their reservation wage. However, people only 
look for jobs if the utility of searching is greater than the alternatives. If in the North of Italy more people withdraw 
from the labour market and the question is not asked, reservation wages in the South will appear to be relatively 
higher. 
7 Conversely, Hofler and Murphy (1994) argue that respondents might understate income questions if the survey is 
run by a government agency and they think that it could affect their tax payments or credit line. In particular, 
unemployed job seekers receiving benefits might state low reservation wages to demonstrate their willingness to 
work. 
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Concerning South African data, Kingdon and Knight (2001) criticise the survey questions in the 1993 
PSLSD survey as open to interpretation and worry that respondents reported wages they find ‘fair’ rather 
than their ‘true’ reservation wage. Furthermore, they point out that respondents living in remote areas with 
low education, or lack of previous work experience, may have no information about their true ‘market 
worth’. Nattrass (2002) explores inconsistencies in the way people reported reservation wages in another 
South African dataset—the 2000/2001 Khayelitsha Mitchell’s Plain (KMP) survey. In her study, 
respondents did not give the same answer to the following two questions: (i) “what is the absolute lowest 
monthly take-home wage that you would accept for any work?” and (ii) “what is the absolute minimum 
take-home monthly wage below which you would not be prepared to work in any job (taking into account 
your desired hours of work)?”. Nattrass speculates that people may respond differently to slightly different 
phrasing of reservation wage questions or that they may not have a definite reservation wage. Furthermore, 
60% of respondents that stated they would work “in a public works programme nearby (cutting down trees 
on the sand dunes) for R33 a day”, stated a higher reservation wage when answering (i).  
Presuming that reservation wages are somehow measured imprecisely, as it appears to be the case both 
internationally and in South Africa, the question arises of how this will influence the estimated coefficients 
from standard empirical labour models. Although it is well known that measurement error can bias the 
parametric estimators of interest, most applied studies assume a classical measurement error–i.e. the error 
is additive and uncorrelated with the other variables in the model. However, this assumption “reflect(s) 
convenience rather than conviction” (Bound et al., 1994) and validation studies (e.g. Bound and Krueger, 
1991; Bound et al., 1994; Bollinger, 1998; or Bricker and Engelhardt, 2008) show that a variety of labour 
market outcomes are affected by non-classical measurement error (see also Bingley and Martinello, 2014). 
As these studies show, the consequences of measurement error on the parameters of interest will depend 
on whether the error is in the dependent or independent variables and will vary significantly across model 
specifications. 
 
2.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
This paper uses data from the Cape Area Panel Study (CAPS). The CAPS is a longitudinal survey of a 
representative sample of youth in the Cape Town metropolitan area. The first wave was conducted in 2002, 
interviewing 4,752 young people between the ages of 14 and 22. Of those 2,140 participants where male. 
As explained below, our empirical analysis will be restricted to a sample of young males. The sample clusters 
were taken from the 1996 Census enumeration areas with the aim to achieve equal sub-samples of black 
and coloured youths.8 For the empirical analysis, individual weights were used to adjust for over-sampling 
of the black youth as well as for individual non-responses so as to provide a representative sample of youth 
 
8 The racial profile in Cape Town is significantly different than in the rest of the country. In the 2001 Census it was 
32% black, 48% coloured, 1.5% Indian, and 19% white, while the total South African population was 77% black, 9% 
coloured, 2.6% Indian and 11% white (Lam et al., 2013). 
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from the metropolitan Cape Town area. The original sample was followed over five waves during the period 
2002 to 2009. Wave 2 of the survey took place in two distinct phases in 2003 and 2004 (Waves 2a and 2b, 
see Lam et al. 2008). Wave 3 and 4 were conducted in 2005 and 2006, respectively, and the entire young 
adult sample was re-interviewed. The last round of CAPS (Wave 5) attempted to re-interview the sample 
and their households for a fifth time in 2009.9  
Young men and women in South Africa face very different labour supply decisions due to gendered social 
norms and fertility decisions, so our empirical analysis of reservation wages is simplified by restricting our 
sample to young males.10 The number of male observations and sample characteristics in each wave can be 
found in Table A1 in the Appendix. Since the set of job offer questions was not asked in Wave 1, most of 
our analysis will be based on the panel sample from Waves 2 to 5. The total attrition rate between these 
waves (2003-2009) is 26.3%.11 Despite non-negligible attrition, we have at least two consecutive panel 
observations for 85.7% of the sample (see Table A2 in the Appendix). Having longitudinal information for 
most of our sample allows us to observe transitions into the labour market and variation in reservation 
wages over time. As shown in Table A1, 25% of the male sampled youth where employed and 58% in 
school in Wave 2. By the fifth wave, 63% of the sample was working and only 9% was still studying. 
As mentioned above, the precise wording of the survey question is important for self-reported reservation 
wages (Lancaster and Chesher, 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). For CAPS, there are two different 
ways to infer the lowest wage individuals would work for. From wave 2 onwards both type of question have 
been asked to all young adults independent on employment status. The first (and traditional) question was: 
“What is the absolute lowest take-home wage that you would accept for any permanent, full-time work?” The second is a 
series of questions about whether or not respondents would accept a sequence of increasing hypothetical 
wage offers,12 e.g. “Would you accept a job as general worker for a monthly wage of R1438?”, “Would you accept a job 
as machine operator for a monthly wage of R1619?” The set of hypothetical job offers have always been asked after 
the traditional reservation wage question. Individuals who respond that they would accept a job offer of 
R1619 but would decline a job offer of R1438 can therefore interpreted to have a reservation wage in the 
[R1438, R1619] interval (which will be referred to as upper and lower bound). Respondents who would 
decline all hypothetical job offers (this share ranges between 5% of the sample in wave 4 and 35% in wave 
5) have reservation wages that exceed the highest wage offer. When responding to these wage offers, 
individuals are required to carefully probe their preferences in a way that is not required when providing an 
answer the traditional reservation wage question. Therefore, in the following this measure will be referred 
as the “probed” reservation wage measure. 
 
9 For a more detailed description of the panel study, including information on study design, enumeration areas and 
sample selection in each wave, see Lam et al. (2013). 
10 In earlier versions of this paper the empirical analysis was performed on both men and women, and the results 
were largely similar to those obtained using the male sample only. 
11 The overall attrition rate between Waves 1 and 5 (2002-2009) is about 36%. 
12 Across the different waves of CAPS, there have been up to 7 different job options included as questions of the 
same type, as well as various wage steps attached to these offers (see Appendix Table A3).  
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In Figure 1, panels A and B display the distribution of the lower and upper bounds of reservation wages as 
just above.13 The panels show that a significant number of people would work in the lowest job category 
(as domestic workers), hence the cluster of observations at the left tail of the distribution in both panels. 
Panel C, on the other hand, plots the distribution of a reservation wage from the categorical information. 
Since the exact value is unobservable to us, an interval regression is used to obtain a point estimate (see 
Table A5 in the Appendix. Typically, an interval regression fits a model of a dependent variable, yi, where 
the information on y for each observation is either interval, left-censored, or right-censored data. Panel C 
shows the probed reservation wages from an interval regression without any explanatory variables. That is, 
the value for each individual is estimated from an assumed log-normal distribution of reservation wages 
between upper and lower bound values.14 For every respondent, the predicted value lies between the last 
declined and first acceptable hypothetical job offer. For those with no last declined information because 
they accept the first option the predicted value is at the left of the first acceptable job offer.15 
Figure 1: Lower/upper bounds and derived reservation wage  
(Source: CAPS wave 2-wave5) 
 
 
13 All monetary values in the analysis of this chapter have been deflated to reflect 2008 prices. Deflator used from: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0141/CPIHistory.pdf
14 Interval regressions are equivalent to an ordered probit model but with fixed cut points (Wooldrige, 2002). The 
interval regression is preferred (and more efficient) because it not only uses the ordering of the intervals, but also the 
values at the intervals. It has the added benefit of giving us predicted Yi values that have economic meaning. 
Comparing our interval regression model with an ordered probit model shows that the log likelihood as well the z-
statistics of the models are similar. Interval regressions have also shown to be more reliable than midpoint estimates 
in case the income brackets are relatively wide (von Fintel, 2007). 
15 If we ran an interval regression with independent variables (education, age, race and labour market status) 
predicted values would be less concentrated to single points, as the information from the independent variables 
allows ‘smoother’ predictions. 
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Undoubtedly, having to derive a point estimate of reservation wages from interval information introduces 
noise in our measure. In the empirical section below, we will show how this needs not be a big concern for 
(at least some) of the empirical models estimated in the paper. A potentially more serious concern for our 
empirical analysis stems from the fact that the survey questions attach specific job titles to the various wage 
offer amounts. That is, we do not know if respondents would consider the same offers as acceptable/not 
acceptable if associated to other types of jobs. It is possible that individual reservation wages vary across 
jobs if the nonwage characteristics differ and if these characteristics enter the individual’s utility function 
(Holzer, 1986b). In extreme cases where a higher wage offer is associated with an occupation that some 
individuals perceive as having very unattractive non-wage attributes, this may lead them to accept wage 
offers that are lower than other rejected offers. For example, in wave 2 and 3, 3.9% of the sample would 
work as a domestic worker for R864 but would not work as a security guard for R1300; and 6.8% of males 
would work as a machine operator for R1619 but not as a cashier for R2000. Restricting our sample to males 
helps remove the effect of gendered occupation-specific non-wage attributes, but 13% of the sample still 
provided responses that violated the transitivity property. It is not clear whether these cases reflect a strong 
preference reversal for the non-wage attributes of adjacent job offers, or response or coding errors. In these 
cases, the upper bound reservation wage is set at the lower amount. Although this is an important caveat 
for our analysis, we argue that attaching specific job titles to wage offers should bias upwards our reservation 
wage derived from these responses. That is, we expect that on average individuals would accept lower wage 
offers if presented with job descriptions more in line with their preferences/skills (Holzer, 1986b). 
 
2.4. Internal consistency 
We start our empirical analysis of the relative reliability of the two reservation wage measures by investigating 
the internal consistency of these responses. In particular, we document how these reservation wages relate 
to each other, and to a series of other wage measures (predicted, typical, and subsequently earned wages). 
We also take advantage of variation in the ordering of questions across survey waves to investigate the 
relative sensitivity of the reservation wage measures to priming effects. 
It is perhaps not surprising to note that in this sample of young South Africans individuals tend to provide 
much higher values to a question about what they perceive as a “typical wage” for someone like them16 than 
the predicted wage for someone who shares their observable productivity characteristics.17 This difference 
is about 40% on average for the whole sample and about 64% for those individuals without any work 
experience. Even though those without any work experience have 30% lower predicted wages than the rest 
 
16 The survey question asks: “What is the typical take-home monthly wage for other people like you (same age, 
education, and skills) who have full-time jobs?”. 
17 As in Rankin and Roberts (2011), the predicted wage is obtained using a Heckman selection estimator with 
education, experience, race, wave and neighbourhood dummies as the productivity attributes and being household 
head, number of people working in the household and household size as the determinants of employment that are 
excluded from the wage equation. 
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of the sample, their reported typical wages are the same. With prevalent weak attachment to the labour 
market, many young job-seekers appear to be over-optimistic about the wage offer distribution, possibly as 
a result of limited market feedback on which they can downwardly adjust their expectations.18 
Figure 2 overlaps the kernel density estimates for the traditional and probed reservation wage responses, as 
well as predicted wages obtained from a Heckman selection model. The curves reveal that all three measures 
appear to be roughly log-normally distributed, and that the traditional reservation wage measure is 
substantially higher on average than the probed reservation wage or predicted wages.  
 
Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of traditional and probed reservation wages, and predicted wages 
 
(Source: CAPS wave 2-5) 
 
 
If responses to the traditional reservation wage question are partly anchored to perceptions about fair or 
desired wages that are only partially adjusted towards the true lowest acceptable wage offer, then we would 
expect the traditional measure to be an upwardly biased estimate of true reservation wages. This would be 
particularly true for those with weak labour market attachment since they are less informed about their 
earning possibilities and would state a traditional reservation wage witch is more correlated to their 
perception of fair wages. By forcing individuals to consider whether or not they would accept specific wage 
offers, we would expect the probed measure to be less biased and hence lower than the traditional measure 
for several individuals. If this hypothesis is correct, then responses to the hypothetical wage offers should 
frequently contradict the responses to the traditional reservation wage question. Indeed, in our sample, these 
kinds of contradictions occurred in about 60% of cases. In other words, roughly 60% of the sample reported 
lowest acceptable wage offers that were higher than one of the hypothetical wage offers that they 
subsequently stated they would accept. This share is even higher for those with weak labour market 
 
18 Holzer (1986b) documents that unemployed black youth in the United States have higher wage expectations 
relative to the labor demand they face. 
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attachment: 67% for those who have not worked before and 66% for those who reside in high 
unemployment districts. These apparent contradictions are entirely consistent with our hypothesis.  
How would we expect the two reservation wage measures to compare to predicted wages, typical wages and 
accepted wages? If the traditional measure is partly anchored to over-optimistic wage expectations that are 
also reflected in responses to typical wages, then we would expect  to be close to responses about the 
perceived typical wage, whereas  should be much lower than that on average. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 
1 confirm that this is indeed the case: the traditional measure is almost identical to individual response about 
typical wages on average, while the probed measure is 61% below this value.  
Predicted wages are reflective of what firms are actually paying workers, and since these wages have been 
accepted by workers, we would expect true reservation wages to be lower than predicted wages on average. 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 demonstrates that the traditional measure is 22% higher than predicted wages, 
whereas the probed measure is 33% lower.  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 compare the two reservation wage measures for the unemployed sample with 
accepted wages in the subsequent survey period. Since job-seekers accept work when receiving a wage offer 
higher or equal to their reservation wage, we would expect most accepted wages to be above previously 
reported reservation wages. This is consistent with what happens for the probed measure, which is on 
average 21% below the accepted wage, whereas the traditional measure is 23% higher on average than 
subsequently accepted wages

Table 1: Mean/median differences between predicted, accepted, typical wages and reservation wages 
 RW – Typical wage RW – Predicted wage RWt-1 – Accepted wage 
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Note: Columns (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) show the numbers for the unemployed sample. Columns (5)-(6) those unemployed 
that found a job next period. (Source: CAPS wave 1-5) 
 
 
Furthermore, about 52% of the unemployed sample accepts a job offer later in the survey that has lower 
monthly wages than their self-reported reservation wage in the previous period. In comparison, 30% of 
reservation wages derived from the explicit job offer questions were larger than the accepted wages. This is 
 
19 We also observe that 55% of accepted wage offers were lower than the traditional reservation wage in the previous 
survey, whereas this was a much lower share of 20% for the probed reservation wage. The upward bias in the 
traditional reservation wage measure may explain why Krueger and Mueller (2015) find that 44 percent of their 
respondents accepted a lower wage than their (traditional) reservation wage in the previous survey period. This 
suggests that our findings may be relevant beyond the South African labor market. 
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a substantial reduction in the degree of ‘over-expectation’ in our sample (even more so considering that we 
believe our derived measure to be upwardly biased).  
If responses to the traditional reservation wage question are partly anchored to other memorable wages, 
then we would expect this measure to be particularly sensitive to seemingly irrelevant priming effects like 
the questions that precede the reservation wage question in the survey. On the other hand, the probed 
measure should be more stable across surveys. The different survey structures provide a pseudo-experiment 
to test this hypothesis. In waves 1, 4 and 5 the traditional reservation wage question followed after questions 
about the current job search strategy or probability of finding work, whereas in waves 2 and 3 it was 
preceded by a question that asked about the individual’s labour market prospects at the age of thirty. Being 
asked to imagine oneself in the future is likely to trigger thoughts of wage aspirations and wishful thinking, 
which – if our hypothesis is correct – should make these wage aspirations more prominent as an anchor for 
responses to the traditional reservation wage question. The hypothetical wage offer questions were also 
moved around in the survey. In wave 1 these questions were not asked, whereas in wave 2 they followed a 
series of questions on government assistance. In waves 3 to 5 these questions followed directly after the 
traditional reservation wage question. Our hypothesis is that being asked to accept or reject specific wage 
offers requires individuals to probe their preferences, which would imply that such responses ought to be 
much less vulnerable to irrelevant priming effects. If true, these responses will be unaffected by the 
preceding question and relatively stable across survey waves. 
 
The observed responses to both measures across waves are reported in Figure 3. The trend in responses to 
the traditional reservation wage question over the survey waves shows a visible upward jump for waves 2 
and 3, when the traditional question was preceded by question on future wage expectations.20 On the other 
hand, the probed reservation wage measure is more stable over time, showing only a moderate concave 
trajectory that is consistent with the Mincerian life-cycle wage path. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This effect is larger for those with weak labour market attachment (as measured by having ever worked before, or 
residing in a high unemployment district) than for the sample as a whole.
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Figure 3: Mean traditional and probed reservation wage values over the 5 wave period. 
 
(Source: CAPS wave 1-5) 
 
 
The patterns in Figure 3 provide further evidence that for many job-seekers responses to the 
traditional reservation wages question might not correspond to the lowest acceptable wage offer. 
Overall, part 3 and 4 have given descriptive evidence for our hypothesis that the answers to the traditional 
reservation wage measure may provide over-inflated and not the true reservation wage, while asking 
individuals about hypothetical wage offers may elicit more reliable responses.  
 
2.5. Regression analysis 
To evaluate whether or not the probed measure is truly more reliable than the traditional measure, two 
regression models are applied. First, we will test which measure is more in line with standard theoretical 
search models by regressing some standard observed variables on the reservation wages and see which 
coefficients are more in line with the theoretical predictions. 
Secondly, we will observe the correlation between employment status, which should be influenced by true 
reservation wages, and our two observed measures. If the traditional measure is more influenced by 
measurement error than the probed measure we would expect a stronger negative correlation between 
employment and the probed variable.  
2.5.1. Measurement error bias and econometric model 
Assuming that reservation wages are measured somehow imprecisely, the question arises how this will 
influence the results of our model. It is well known that measurement error in the data can bias the 
parametric estimators of interest. In applied studies, the underlying assumption normally is that 
measurement error is classical, i.e., the error is additive, not correlated with the dependent, independent and 
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all other variables in the model. However, this assumption “reflect convenience rather than conviction” 
(Bound et al. 1994) and all seminal validation studies e.g. Bound and Krueger (1991), Bound et al. (1994), 
Bollinger (1998) or Bricker and Engelhardt (2008) show that labour market-related outcomes are affected 
by non-classical measurement error (Bingley and Martinello 2014).  
The consequences of measurement error on the parameters of interest β depends on the type of model, 
whether the error is in the dependent or independent variable and whether the error is classical or non-
classical in nature (Hausman 2001). Given that the error is additive and using ordinary least squares 
estimators the following model should be estimated: 
01  2  31  4 
However, we do not observe the true 01or the true 31 but rather: 
05  01  6 
35  31  7 
In case the measurement error is classical and 05 is observed instead of 01 the  coefficient is still consistent 
and only the standard error 89 is larger (Bound et al. 2001). If 31instead of 35 is measured the OLS estimator 
will give an inconsistent	. By textbook the bias will be: 
plim :  	 ;<=;<=>;?=   
 is normally referred to as to as the reliability ratio and since 0<	 <1 the coefficient :  is biased towards 
zero and known as the attenuation bias. If there is only one independent variable the proportional bias is 
just equal to 8@/8A. Second, Bound et al. (1994) show that even if the error is non-classical, i.e. 7 is 
correlated with the true 31 the proportional downward bias is equal to the regression coefficient for 35 
from a regression of 7 on the set of measured	35 . 
We are interested in correctly estimating the determinants of reservation wages. However, there are good 
reasons to believe that the assumption BC6351D 65  '	is not valid, e.g. people who have never worked 
before or are less attached to the labour market might give less accurate answers when asked what the lowest 
amount is that they would work for. This is in line with the findings of Krueger and Mueller (2014) that find 
less accurate reservation wages for the long term unemployed. This group is susceptible to stating different 
reservation wages depending on whether they are asked directly or if they are questioned using a set of 
verbal multiple choice job options. It follows that the measurement error is non-classical and the coefficients 
in the OLS model will be biased. In case of this non-classical measurement error the error term is mean-
reverting: individuals with particularly high reservation wages are more likely to under-report and those with 
very low reservation wages are more inclined to over-report. This could arise if, for example, individuals 
with a weaker labour market attachment are simultaneously more desperate about the wages they would 
accept and more likely to over-report their reservation wage. In this case the measurement error is mean-
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reverting, and should induce a negative correlation between the measurement error and the true reservation 
wage, EC66D 1 F '. In this case the measurement error will displace some of the informative variation 
in the reservation wage measure, which will attenuate the regression coefficients towards zero. This 
attenuation bias will be larger, the higher the variance of the measurement error term. 
The categorical nature of the information obtained from the hypothetical reservation wage also poses certain 
econometric complications. However, when the reservation wage is the dependent variable, the coefficient 
estimates from an interval regression21 are directly comparable to those obtained from an OLS regression 
on reservation wage point data.  
Our hypothesis implies two predictions about the relationship between the determinants of reservation 
wages and the two observed measures. First, measurement error may have the effect of attenuating the 
coefficients on the explanatory variables and this attenuation should be stronger for the traditional than for 
the probed measure. Secondly, we would expect proxies of weak labour market attachment (e.g. whether 
the individual has worked before or whether the individual resides in a high unemployment region) to be 
positively associated with the traditional measure, but not with the probed measure. We test these 
implications in Table 2 below. 
2.5.2. Determinants of reservation wages 
Standard job-search theory suggests that reservation wages should be higher for those with valuable assets, 
high non-wage income, who reside in high transportation cost regions, who possess productive attributes 
that are associated with higher predicted wages, who have been unemployed for a relatively short duration, 
and who reside in low unemployment regions. International studies have confirmed that these predictions 
can accurately describe the self-reported reservation wages of job-seekers in countries where these 
individuals have a stronger attachment to the labour market (e.g. Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001; Addison 
et al., 2009; Krueger and Mueller, 2014).  
We posit the following basic regression model to estimate the determinants of log of reservation wages: 
GH		I			I		J/*		I		K/*		L/*		 	 	
where rw1 is equal to the log of monthly reservation wages observed by the traditional measure. Xit is a 
vector consisting of the variables of interest: an asset index generated by multiple correspondence analysis 
(MCA)22; log per capita household work income and log per capita household grant income; log of the 
 
21 Interval regressions are ordered probit estimators in which the cut-offs are specified rather than estimated 
(Wooldrige, 2002). If the thresholds at which the latent variable produces different discrete values are economically 
meaningful, then the coefficient vector inherits this property. Furthermore, its magnitudes are directly comparable to 
those obtained from an estimator that uses continuous point data as the dependent variable.  
22 Although it is more common to use a related technique, the Principal Component Analysis, it has been shown that 
MCA is preferable for variables that are not continuous or normally distributed (Booysen et al., 2008). The index is 
based on variables relating to various aspects of the household’s living conditions including access to water and 
sanitation, as well as on household assets like having a car or TV. 
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cluster transport costs23; log of predicted wages, log of unemployment spell in weeks24, the local 
unemployment rate and a variable indicating if the young work seeker has ever worked before. Cit is a vector 
for the set of control variables consisting of some education dummies to control for ability and schooling, 
as well as wave and location dummies. For the probed measure a similar model is estimated, using the same 
set of variables of interest Xit and control variables Cit in an interval regressions. 
In Table 2, the coefficients from regressions of both reservation wage measures from model (2) are reported. 
The dependent variable in column (1) is the traditional measure, while in column (2) we report the results 
from the interval regression. We use panel weights in all specifications to partially correct for non-random 
attrition and report robust standard errors. Overall, the estimated coefficients in Table 2 confirm that the 
predictors of true reservation wages affect both measures in the correct direction, but have a weaker partial 
correlation with the traditional than with the probed measure. This is most notably true for the effect of 
household assets, household income and transportation costs, all of which have greater magnitude and 
significance in the specification using the probed measure as the dependent variable. Our findings are in 
line with recent papers (e.g. Sienaert 2008, Abel 2013) showing a significant positive effect of non-grant and 
grant per capita household income on reservation wages. It also indicates the potential problem of high 
transport costs, increasing reservation wages for those living in places far removed from the business 
centres.  
Notably, there seems to be a significant negative correlation between reservation wages and the 
unemployment spell for both measures. That means an increase of the unemployment spell of one month 
is associated with a reduction in the reservation wage of 0.4%. The finding of a small decrease of reservation 
wages over the unemployment spell, is in line with studies like Addison et al. (2009) or Krueger and Mueller 
(2014). However, while Krueger and Mueller (2014) find that the decrease in reservation wages is mainly 
driven by older individuals, our results are negative and significant for a sample of youth respondents. We 
interpret this finding as being consistent with a process of learning about the wage offer distribution by the 
unemployed youth in South Africa. Ideally we would like to observe the impact of savings or unemployment 
insurance benefits on reservation wages but this information is not captured in CAPS. In addition, only a 
minority of the youth has access to the unemployment insurance as only individuals with continuous formal 
employment become eligible (Abel, 2013). 
When an individual resides in a high unemployment district, this ought to decrease the true reservation wage 
via the decreased wage offer arrival rate (as is the case for the probed measure), but it also pushes up the 
 
23 Theoretically transport costs should have a significant effect on reservation wages in South Africa, where there is 
substantial spatial separation between business centres and residential areas as well as a lack of affordable public 
transportation (Banerjee et al., 2008). Unfortunately, information about transport costs was not available for a high 
number of respondents. For this reason, we use mean transport costs for each sample cluster instead, as a proxy for 
potential transport costs of the unemployed in that cluster. 
24 In each wave unemployed are youth looking for work in the last 30 days or those not looking for a job but wanting 
to work. Unemployment duration can be derived for all unemployed youth since a set of questions in wave 1 
enquires about unemployment spells and employment status in each panel month. 
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wage anchor because the individual will have had fewer opportunities to downwardly adjust their unrealistic 
wage expectation. The district unemployment rate coefficient in the traditional measure regression shows 
that these two effects cancel out to leave the reservation wage unaffected by the local unemployment rate. 
Individuals who have worked before ought to have more realistic and hence lower wage expectations. This 
can be seen to have a strong negative effect on the traditional measure – which we have argued is often 
anchored to wage expectations – but not on the probed measure.25  
Table 2: Determinants of reservation wages 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS Interval regression 
VARIABLES log(MNO) log(MNP) 
	 	 	
Q$*	/&.$R	 ''''	 ''SSS	
		 ''	 '' 	
TUV	W$GX	YY	HUGZ	/&XU[$	 ''!	 ''S	
		 ''!	 ''	
TUV	W$GX	YY	VG%&*	/&XU[$	 ''	 ''!	
		 ''"	 ''!	
T&	,UX%,	*G%&WUG*%*/U&	XU*	 '' 	 ''!S	
		 ''	 ''	
T&	WG$./X*$.	H%V$	 ''SSS	 '!SSS	
		 '' 	 '' 	
TUV	-&$[W,U\[$&*	.-G%*/U&	 (''!SSS	 (''SSS	
		 ''	 ''	
TUX%,	-&$[W,U\[$&*	G%*$	 ''''	 ('"SS	
		 '	 ''	
]+$G	HUGZ$.	 (''SSS	 (''	
		 ''	 '' 	
KU&*%&*	 SSS	  !SSS	
	 ' 	 ' 	
	 	 	
$G+%*/U&	 ""	 ""	
^(_-%G$.	 '	 	
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Not listed: wave, district and schooling dummies. Sample: Unemployed male with info on both reservation wage 
measures. (Source: CAPS wave 2-5.) 

2.5.3. Employment effects 
A common empirical question in labour economics is whether or not high reservation wages impede 
employability in the labour market. Previous studies on South African data – typically based on the self-
reported measure of reservation wages – have found little evidence that high reservation wages are a 
disincentive to accept low wage offers. It is also well understood that measurement error in the dependent 
variable can attenuate the coefficients in a linear regression framework (Bound et al., 1994). Non-classical 
properties in the measurement error, like mean reversion, will typically diminish but not eliminate this 
attenuation bias. Our hypothesis would therefore imply that both reservation wage measures should have a 
weaker effect on individual behaviour than is the case for the true reservation wage, but that this attenuation 
 
To control for the robustness of the results, we recreated the analysis of Table 2 after dropping all inconsistent 
answers to the probed reservation wage. While there were a few small changes, the signs of all coefficient stayed the 
same and similar significances could be observed. The same is true when using a simple OLS model instead of 
Interval regressions for the probed model.
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bias ought to be more severe for the traditional than for the probed measure. We test this by estimating the 
effects of both measures on labour market behaviour we can observe for the young job-seekers in CAPS. 
As mentioned in part 3, to deal with the fact that the probed reservation wage is categorical we use an 
interval regression to estimate the conditional expectation of the respondent’s reservation wage, and use 
this point estimate as the independent variable in the labour market regressions.  
First, to observe the relationship between reservation wages and probability of employment we use fixed 
effects (FE) and first-differenced (FD) estimators. Allowing for individual fixed effects removes the 
potential bias due to unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, such as worker ability or attitude, which may 
simultaneously determine the probability of finding work and the reservation wage. We also use lagged 
values of the reservation wage to address reverse causality concerns: finding work may cause workers to 
upwardly adjust their reservation wages (e.g. Krueger and Mueller, 2014), which could induce an upward 
bias in the reservation wage coefficient estimate. Table 3 columns (1) and (2) show the regression results 
for the FE and FD estimators. The coefficients for the lag of the probed measure are -0.041 and -0.061, 
revealing a negative correlation between the probed reservation wage measure and the probability of being 
employed, as predicted by economic theory. This effect is significant (0.062) and marginally significant (p-
value 0.11) in the FD and FE estimators, respectively. On the other hand, the coefficient for the traditional 
measure is not significant in either specifications.26To check for the robustness of the results and deal with 
the potential problem of multicollinearity, the FD and FE model shown in Table 3 have also been run 
without entering both reservation wage measures at the same time. The results given in Table A6 (in the 
Appendix) show basically the same pattern as before, except that the probed reservation wage measure is 
now also significant negative in the fixed effect model. 
Second, we can observe how accepted wage offers are correlated to the lagged reservation wage measures. 
Theoretically one would assume that job-seekers who are less desperate about which job offers they would 
accept should transition into employment less frequently, but do so for higher wages. Therefore, past 
reservation wages should be positively correlated with accepted wages. Table 3, column (3) shows that there 
is indeed a highly significant positive coefficient for the probed but not for the traditional measure.  
 
Next, we separately consider the effect of reservation wages on transitioning into and out of employment. 
Column (4) contains the regression coefficients for a FE employment regression where the sample is 
restricted to those who were unemployed in the previous period. The coefficients reveal that the probed 
measure has a large and marginally significant (p-value 0.103) effect on transitioning into employment, 
whereas the traditional measure has a much smaller and insignificant effect on the probability of finding 
 
26 When estimating the employment regression without fixed effects and using only the contemporary traditional 
reservation wages measure we find, like Nattrass and Walker (2005), that this measure is positively correlated with 
the probability of finding work. However, we interpret this as evidence of the importance of addressing the 
problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causality. It is worth noting that even in this specification, the 
traditional measure is only significant when included on its own, but turns insignificant once it is included along with 
the probed measure. It seems that even the endogenous variation in reservation wages is more reliably captured with 
the probed than with the traditional measure. 
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work. The coefficients in column (5), where the sample is restricted to those who were employed in the 
previous period, show that neither reservation wage measure can explain transitions out of employment. Of 
course, reservation wages may not affect whether or not a worker gets fired, so a more instructive question 
may be whether reservation wages determine voluntary movements out of employment. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is that people are more likely to quit their job if their reservation wage is high in comparison to 
the salary they are receiving. To understand whether people with higher reservation wages are more likely 
to quit their jobs, we use responses to a question in CAPS that asks the “reasons for losing your last job” 
(see Table A4 in the Appendix). In column (6) we run a regression comparing youth who quit their job to 
those who lost their job for other reasons (i.e. fired, contract ended, business bankrupt). It shows that on 
average people who quit have significantly higher probed reservation wages which again is not the case for 
the traditional measure. 
 
Table 3: Effects of reservation wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 FE FD OLS FE FE FE FE 
Variable Employed ∆Employed 
Accepted 
wage 
Transitioned 
into 
employment 
Transitioned 
out of 
employment 
Quit Discouraged 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Also controlled for years of schooling, experience and wave dummies. (Source: CAPS wave 2-5)27 
 
 
 
27 To check for the robustness of the results, in the Appendix Table 3 has been reproduced without entering both 
reservation wage measures at the same time. In addition, column 4, 5 and 6 have been run using OLS as well. The 
results show basically the same pattern as before, except that the probed reservation wage measure is now also 
significant negative in the fixed effect model.
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Finally, we examine the difference between the economically inactive and discouraged job-seekers. Both 
types of individuals reported not looking for work, but the discouraged job-seekers responded they would 
work if someone would offer them a job. This difference in willingness to work should be reflected in a 
higher reservation wage for the economically inactive than discouraged job-seekers. On the one hand, 
economically inactive express no desire to work at what they perceive as current wages, which implies that 
they must have relatively high reservation wages. On the other hand, discouraged job seekers, do wish to 
work at current wages, which should lead them to have lower reservation wages than the economically 
inactive. Or in other words a stronger desire to work should lead to lower reservation wages. Table 3 column 
(7) provides the regression output of the two measures on the likelihood being discouraged. It shows a 
larger significant negative log(rw2) coefficient, which again suggests that the probed reservation wage 
measure is a more reliable indication of an individual’s preferences than the traditional measure. 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explores whether individuals provide reliable answers when asked to state their reservation 
wages. By taking advantage of the peculiar way the CAPS data in South Africa was collected we can compare 
two different approaches in capturing reservation wages. The empirical analysis suggests that the way 
surveys ask for reservation wages is important. Young work seekers may systematically misreport their 
reservation wages especially if they are less attached to the labour market. The resulting measurement error 
can bias the coefficients of common regression models used in empirical labour analysis. 
Individuals asked to report their lowest acceptable wage appear to start their thought process by thinking 
of a desired wage (especially when primed by a question about aspirations or expectations) and then not 
downwardly adjust sufficiently. Hence, our analysis shows that respondents give higher and less reliable 
answers to the traditional reservation wage question. On the other hand, our probed measure seems to be 
more internally consistent and the regression results to be in line with labour market search models. That 
is, using the probed measure we find significant positive effects of transportation costs and household 
wealth, as well as household income on reservation wages. Having a unique panel of young job-seekers we 
can also show a significant negative correlation with unemployment duration. This result is in line with the 
international literature and it is a novel finding for South Africa. Our results lead us to conclude that there 
is a distinct possibility of non-classical measurement error in reservation wages - i.e. correlated with at least 
some of the other independent variables. 
We therefore conclude that when questioning about reservation wages in survey designs, the researcher 
should be aware of ordering and avoid asking about life aspiration and other questions that could cause 
some form of anchoring. There seems to be evidence that this could trigger some cognitive process where 
respondents think of desired or fair wages they want to earn and won’t report the lowest amount they would 
accept. The magnitude of this anchoring effect might be an interesting research question for future 
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experimental studies. To obtain a meaningful reservation wage, the survey could first ask:  “What is the 
absolute lowest monthly take home wage you would accept for full employment” giving the respondents a 
list of rand values to choose from, e.g.: 1000Rand, 1500Rand, 2000R, 3000R, 5000R, 8000Rand, more than 
12000R. 
With regards to the relationship between reservation wages and employment probabilities, we show that 
young workers with higher wage expectations are less likely to be employed in the next period. This is in 
contrast to previous studies on the South African labour market. We argue that our analysis provides more 
robust evidence because it explicitly considers the effect of measurement error in reservation wages and 
because it controls for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. This new evidence can help provide more 
reliable evidence of the causes of youth unemployment to policymakers. 
More generally, this study shows that the way surveys elicit information on reservation wages is of relevance. 
We suggest that researchers might overestimate reservation wages when using self-reported amounts. On 
the other hand, we show that responses based on hypothetical job offers are more in line with expected 
patterns from economic theory. 
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Chapter 3:  
Estimating income mobility -  
A cross country comparison 

3.1. Introduction 
A better understanding of economic mobility lies at the heart of development economics and is of great 
concern to many researchers and policy makers. This chapter aims to measure income mobility using “micro 
growth regression”, where income growth is regressed on initial income. Such an approach will provide an 
estimate of “absolute mobility” and corresponds to the idea that mobility will lower total inequality as well 
as providing equality of opportunity (Antman and Mckenzie, 2007a). Previous studies using this approach 
have found large negative coefficients of the initial income variable, which would imply strong “beta-
convergence” (e.g. Fields et al., 2003a; Woolard and Klasen, 2005). Translating the convergence coefficient 
from Fields et al. (2003a) of -0.56 (over 5 years) for South Africa would suggest that half the income gap 
between any two households in the country should be eliminated within 4.3 years. Although a new affluent 
black elite and middle class has evolved since the mid-1990s, most of the black population continues to live 
in poverty with very little income growth (Adato et al., 2006). On the other hand, most whites remain close 
to the top end of the South African income distribution, which is difficult to reconcile with the rapid speed 
of convergence suggested by previous studies (e.g. Fields et al., 2003a). One explanation of this apparent 
paradox could be the mean-regressive effect of classical measurement error (Fields et al., 2014). In particular 
for developing countries where collecting reliable survey data is difficult, it is known that measurement error 
could cause income dynamics to be largely overestimated (Antman and Mckenzie, 2007a; Fields, 2008a). 
Moreover, it has been acknowledged that new approaches to deal with measurement error in micro-mobility 
have to be found (Fields, 2008b).  
This chapter aims to apply a newly developed GMM estimator, proposed by Burger et al. (2016), to quantify 
the effect of measurement error in income data when estimating economic mobility. This approach has the 
advantage of being more efficient than the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator used in previous studies 
and it allows testing for the validity of the underlying assumptions of the framework. In addition, the method 
can be generalised for the case of non-classical measurement error. That is, it allows the income convergence 
estimates of  and the measurement error statistic a to change with the initial level of household income. 
This approach will be applied to four large representative national panel studies from the USA, South Africa, 
Chile and Tanzania. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the USA makes it possible to 
compare the speed of convergence and the data-reliability statistic from the GMM estimator to the results 
from previous validation studies. The findings show that the naïve OLS regression overestimate the extent 
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of income mobility by a factor of about 5, while the half-life convergence gap prediction of the GMM model 
are about 26.7 years and in line with the results from studies like Chetty at al. (2014).  
Applying the GMM estimator to data sets from South Africa, Chile and Tanzania provides some additional 
important insights into the reliability of income mobility estimates using panel date from developing 
countries. In light of recent interest in a new growing middle class (e.g. Ravallion, 2010; Burger et al., 2015) 
and understanding poverty dynamics in these countries, the results of this study should also provide 
evidence on how measurement error might influence vulnerability estimates and poverty analysis. The 
findings from all three countries, strongly indicate the presence of measurement error and imply that 
previous studies have overestimated the degree of mobility by a factor of 4-5 for South Africa and Tanzania 
and 5-6 for Chile. In particular, for Chile and Tanzania between 36% and 45% of the income variance seem 
to be due to measurement error in the initial income variable instead of actual income changes. Finally, the 
nonparametric estimates clearly show that the convergence coefficient is larger for poor households in all 
countries and measurement error is non-classical in nature. That is, income is more reliably captured for 
richer than for poorer households.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. 
Section 3 gives an outline of the strategy. Section 4 briefly discusses the data followed by the presentation 
of the results. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
3.2. Income mobility and measurement error 
There is an extensive literature on the measurement of economic mobility.28 This chapter is based on the 
micro growth literature using panel data to compare how income is changing between two points in time. 
We will restrict our attention to the concept of weak unconditional beta convergence. Accordingly, the log 
per capita household income	bc1, is characterised as an autoregressive process of order 1, or AR(1) process: 
bc1  d  bce1  7c
In this context, the standard measure of economic mobility is the slope coefficient from a regression of 
current period earnings on lagged earnings (e.g. Jarvis and Jenkins, 1998; Fields et al., 2003a; Antman and 
Mckenzie, 2007a; Fields et al., 2014). The simple earnings dynamics model is: 
fbc1  bc1  bce1  d  bce1  7c    
where  g 	   represents the extent of income mobility in the economy. This model is straightforward 
to interpret and provides a measure of convergence. When  F ' incomes are exhibiting conditional 
convergence, while when  h ', conditional divergence takes place. Empirically, the existing literature from 
 
28 Jäntti and Jenkins (2014) provide a comprehensive review on this topic. 
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developing countries has mostly found that  F ', which implies that poor households on average grow 
more rapidly than the rich and incomes converges to the conditional mean (e.g. Fields et al., 2003a; Woolard 
and Klasen 2005; Fields and Puerta, 2010).  
While most empirical studies interpret the  simply to determine income convergence, the point estimate 
of  can also be understood as the speed at which this convergence occurs. In the cross-country growth 
literature it is common practice to estimate how fast countries converge on their steady states (e.g. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004, p. 58)). We follow a similar approach calculating how rapidly the income gap 
between two arbitrarily households in the country will disappear. Equation [1] and the assumption that 
income shocks are i.i.d. imply that the expected one-period change in the relative income gap between any 
two households (denoted i and j) can be expressed as: 
kblDce1  bmDce1 n  okblDc1  bmDc1 pblDce1  bmDce1 n
blDce1  bmDce1  
Therefore, if  F ' then  represents the share of any income gap that we would expect to be eliminated 
between periods q   and q. To calculate the expected half-life of an income gap, i.e. the time it will take 
for half of any income gap to be eliminated, the simple formula q r 2stuvw>x periods can be used. For 
example, Fields et al. (2003a) find convergence coefficients of -0.56 (over 5 years for South Africa), -0.53 
(over 4 years for Indonesia), -0.52 (over 1 year for Spain) and -0.64 (over 1 year for Venezuela). These 
coefficients imply that the expected half-life of the income gap between the richest and poorest households 
is 4.3 years (South Africa), 3.7 years (Indonesia), 1 year (Spain) and 0.7 years (Venezuela), respectively.  
However, a consistent measurement of  is needed to evaluate the true amount of mobility and speed of 
convergence. In practice, the collection of income and consumption data in household surveys is often not 
precise and noisy, thus we observe 05Dc	y	05Dc1 	45Dc. This means ∆Yt and Yt-1 are both measured with error 
and the OLS estimate of  is biased. Hence, Antman and McKenzie (2007a) find that the naïve OLS 
estimates would suggest that 33 percent of the gap in income between two randomly selected households 
would close within three months, however their pseudo-panel analysis finds that only 1.2 percent of this 
gap would be eliminated during the same time. Glewwe (2012) using an IV approach with panel data from 
Vietnam finds that between 15 to 42 percent of estimated economic mobility is due to measurement error. 
Similarly, when predicting long-term household income in an IV approach, Fields et al. (2014) find signs of 
rapid convergence using the inconsistent OLS estimator ( = −0.558), while the results from the 2SLS show 
much lower convergence ( = −0.090). The authors explain the difference by apparent short run shocks.29 
While shocks may play a role, they are unlikely to lead to a more than six-fold increase to measured income 
convergence as in the above estimates.  
 
29 Mean earnings appear to be converging stronger in the OLS regression because workers who received an initial 
positive (negative) earnings shock may now adjusting back to their lower (higher) permanent level of earnings. 
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The degree and direction of the bias will depend on the assumptions one makes about 45Dc. In recent years, 
many studies have tried to quantify the magnitude and direction of such measurement error in income and 
earnings data. Most of these studies used validation data from different sources such as administrative data, 
and defined measurement error as the difference between the survey and the administrative data (e.g. Bound 
and Krueger 1991; Bound et al. 1994). The only validation study to use data from a developing country is a 
study by Akee (2011) using data for Micronesia in the Western Pacific Ocean.  
To summarize the findings of the validation literature it is useful to think how the error 45Dc influences the 
OLS estimator . Antman and McKenzie (2007a) show that under the assumption that the cross-sectional 
sample size N increases towards infinity, the z{|} asymptotic bias can be written as:
z{|}  ~EC6k75cD 05Dcen  EC6k45c D 45Dcen  EC6k45c D 05Dce
1 n  EC6k45Dcen 
EC6k05Dce
1 D 45cen05Dce   
The first term EC6k75c D 05Dcen is positive and nonzero in the presence of individual fixed effects in the 
error term u and if earnings shocks, u are autocorrelated. Findings from the U.S. validation studies show 
that measurement errors are auto-correlated over time and the second term EC6k45c D 45Dcen is positive. 
However, Akee (2011) finds that there is almost no correlation between the error terms over the six year 
period in his study in the data. 
Regarding the covariance between true earnings and the measurement error		EC6k05Dce1 D 45cen, studies 
using U.S. data have found a negative correlation which imply mean reverting effects (e.g. Bound and 
Kruger, 1991; Gottschalk and Huynh, 2010), which has also been shown by Akee (2011) for Micronesia. It 
suggests that individuals who have low earnings are more likely to over report and those with high earnings 
tend to understate their earnings in the survey.  
In the special case that there are no fixed effects and the measurement error is classical in nature (45c is mean 
zero), the z{|} asymptotic bias is: 
z{|}     kDnD    
In the case where the classical measurement error is large this would lead to an attenuation bias toward zero 
and overstate true mobility and convergence (Fields, 2008a). 
Another way of thinking of the problem is to estimate the total variation in the initial income measure that 
is due to variation in actual initial income, bce1 , rather than measurement error, 4ce. Under the assumption 
that	bc, suffers from classical measurement error, i.e. 4c g bc  bc1'D 8, rewriting equation [1] in 
terms of the observed but noisy income measure gives: 
fbc  d  bce  7c  4c    4ce   
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As revealed in [3], initial income bce is negatively correlated with the model error term via the initial period 
measurement error term 4ce, which will downwardly bias the OLS estimate of the convergence parameter 
. In this context, Burger et al. (2015) show that the expected value of the OLS slope coefficient obtained 
from regressing fbc on bce (which we denote as z) can be expressed as:  
oz  v9D99   
ex>;=
9    a    
where a g 91 9 
91 
k91 n>;= which represents the reliability of the observed measure of initial 
income bce and is also sometimes referred to as the “reliability statistic” (Gottschalk & Huynh, 2010; 
Abowd & Stinson, 2013). If a   income is measured without error, while a  ' would indicate that the 
income measure contains no information about the “true” household income b1.  
The structure of the error 45Dc will not only influence the direction of the bias in  but also the techniques 
to correct for it. To address measurement error in the absence of administrative data mostly two approach 
have been used. A pseudo-panel using cross sectional data (e.g. Antman and McKenzie, 2007a, 2007b; 
Cuesta and Pizzolitto, 2011) and an IV approach using predicted long-term income, where the prediction is 
based on household or individual characteristics such as age, education, sector of occupation and dwelling 
characteristics (e.g. Fields et al., 2003a, 2003b; Lee, 2010; Glewwe, 2012; and Fields et al., 2014). However, 
Cruces et al. (2013), constructing pseudo-panel - from Chilean panel data, conclude that this methodology 
does not perform well in predicting the income mobility pattern seen in the actual panel data. In another 
study Newhouse (2005), estimates income dynamics in Indonesia and addresses non-random income 
measurement error and unobserved household heterogeneity by using several instruments, including rainfall, 
assets and consumption. In this chapter we will follow a different new approach developed in the paper by 
Burger et al. (2016). The idea is to use the information provided in a three wave panel set to simultaneously 
estimate the extent of income mobility and the reliability of the income measure. The GMM estimator is 
also more efficient than a classical 2SLS approach. The detailed assumptions and technique will be explained 
in part 4 below.  
The problem of potential measurement error in the existing income panel data has been well recognized in 
the literature concerned with poverty dynamics in South Africa (see for example Agüero et al., 2007; Fields 
et al. 2003a, 2003b; and Woolard and Klasen, 2005). In fact, it has been argued that measurement error in 
developing countries could be even larger than found in existing validation studies from industrialized 
countries such as the US with mostly formal employment (Fields et al. 2003a; Antman and McKenzie 2007a). 
In the following parts, we shall estimate the extent of measurement error in South African panel data and 
compare this to Tanzania and Chile data sets. To validate the reliability of our approach we will first compare 
the convergence estimates obtained from the GMM estimator with some validation studies from the US. 
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3.3. Methodology 
In this part the methodology used to estimate  – the speed of convergence – and a – an approximation 
for the reliability of observed measures of initial income bce – should be explained. To get a benchmark 
for our results, we will also estimates the slope coefficient  using naïve OLS and IV estimators following 
the approach by Lechtenfeld and Zoch (2014). Here the second lagged income variable bce was used to 
instrument for basic year income bce in a 2SLS procedure. 
As mentioned before, for the main analysis the GMM estimator suggested by Burger et al. (2016) will be 
applied. For this approach, more than 2 waves of panel data is needed and the following assumption have 
to be valid: First, the income dynamics equation [1] can be generalised as:  
fbc1  dc  cbce1  7c    [6] 
and the intercept as well as the slope of the first-order autoregressive income process are time-varying. 
Second, the income convergence coefficient  is constant over the period observed in the data, that is c 
 F ' and 7c'D 8@. This assumption should be unproblematic for small t and can be tested 
empirically. Third, income measurement error is classical: 4c g bc  bc1'D 8. Since, validation 
studies from the US have shown that measurement error is non-classical in the context of earnings (e.g. 
Bound and Kruger, 1991; Gottschalk and Huynh, 2010), the approach allows to test for the assumption of 
classical as well as no measurement error. Allowing for this assumption seven regression coefficients can be 
used to estimate β and a which can be found in column 1 in Table 1. The L(.) represents the linear projection 
operator, e.g.	bpb represents the linear projection of b on b. Column 2 gives the predicted 
coefficients under the assumption of no measurement error, while column 3 provides the estimated effect 
of classical measurement error on z-z.  
 
Table 1: Regression coefficients and population moments 
Parameter 
Population mean 
No measurement error Classical measurement error 
z b  bpb  zb    a   
z b  bpb  zb    a   
z b  bpb  zb    a   
z b  bpb  zb    a     
z b  bpbD b  zb  zsb '   
a  a
a      
zs b  bpbD b  zb  zsb    a    a
  
a      
z b  bpb  b  zb  b  
  a  a
  a  a 
Source: Table provided by Burger et al. (2016). 
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The basic rationale of the coefficients are as follows: 
z, gives the effect of wave 1 incomeD 	b, on subsequent income growth between waves 1 and 2, ` b. While 
z represents the same relationship between wave 2 income,	b, and `b. These two coefficients should 
provide the convergence estimator  if income is measured without error but will be biased as follows under 
the assumption of classical error:	  a  .  
z can be obtained from regressing fb on b	and z from regressing b  b on b. In the absence of 
measurement error and a stationary AR(1) process the regression coefficient z should be    and 
z   , that is a larger proportion of the initial income gap should be eliminated between wave 1 and 
3 as between wave 2 and 3. Using the formula provided in column 3 allows to test for the presence of 
measurement error: it will downwardly bias the coefficients of z and z, and will upwardly bias z. In the 
presence of measurement error there should be unexpectedly little additional income convergence between 
waves 2 and 3, given the income mobility that is observed between waves 1 and 2.  
The regression coefficients z and zs are obtained from regressing b and b simultaneously on `b. If 
there is no error : okzpD a  n  ' and okzspD a  n  , that is b	should have no effect on ` b 
when simultaneously controlling for b. However, this should be different when z and zs are affected by 
measurement error. In this case, b will be correlated with the true value of wave 2 income b which will 
intensify the attenuation bias in the coefficient on b and zs will be more downwardly biased than	z. On 
the other hand, measurement error should upwardly biased regression coefficient z, which will make an 
AR(1) process seem like an AR(2) process in which income growth depends negatively on the first lag of 
income and positively on second lag of income.  
Finally, z is captured by regressing `b on `b and has an expected value of =, since households that 
experienced faster income growth between waves 1 and 2 should grow slower in the next period. However, 
in the presence of measurement error this negative correlation should be larger than expected. 
Having set up regression coefficients z-z enables us to test whether or not income is really measured 
without error: a =1, measurement error is classical and if there is an AR1 income process that produce an 
internally consistent set of regression coefficients. For example, Burger et al. (2016) show that the regression 
coefficients z and z provide the parameters of interest as: 
:   ¡ > and a¢ 
k >n=
 ¡> >     [7] 
In such way, calculating a will directly test he hypothesis of no measurement error. Hence, using all 
regression coefficients at the same time would provide a test for the hypothesis that a =1. If income is 
measured without error and income has the form of an AR1 process, then the predicted and estimated 
coefficient values should only differ due to sampling variation. In a similar way, calculating the implied 
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values for  from column 3 in Table 1 provides another opportunity to test the hypothesis of no 
measurement error. Finally, if a £1 then the value of a and the formula provided in column 3 of Table 1 
could be used to calculate the expected values of  implied by the regression coefficients. If the calculated 
and observed estimates are within a relatively narrow range for these new estimates obtained using a £1, 
then we can reject the hypothesis of no measurement error but can maintain the assumption of classical 
measurement error and an AR1 process.  
While the informal approach outlined above gives a simple intuitive way to test the measurement error 
assumptions, the GMM system estimator developed in Burger et al. (2016) offers a more efficient approach 
to estimating the model parameters and testing the over-identifying restrictions. Maintaining the assumption 
of classical measurement error, the regression coefficients z-z provide five linearly independent 
coefficients that depend on two unknown parameters. Using the relationship between  and a developed 
in Table 1 allows to construct a vector of sample moments:  
¤kb5c D ¥D an 
¦§
§§
§
¨ b5  b5  zb5b5b5  b5  zb5b5
b5  b5  zb5b5
b5  b5  zb5  zsb5b5
kb5  b5  zb5  b5nb5  b5©
ªª
ªª
«
 
With the identifying assumption o~¤kb5c D ¥2D a2n  ' follows directly from the assumptions that both 
7c and ¬c are i.i.d. processes. The GMM estimator can then be expressed as:  
k:D a¢n  %GV[/&xD­ ®

¯∑ ¤kb5c D ¥D an5c ±
²³  ®¯∑ ¤kb5c D ¥D an5c ±   [8] 
where ³   is the weighting matrix. Even in the case of no measurement error, the GMM estimator should 
give more efficient estimates of the convergence parameter  than estimates of regression coefficients z 
and z. Second, the GMM estimator provides a J-test statistic which allows testing of the validity of the 
identifying assumptions.  
Finally, to deal with the concerns that measurement error is not classical in nature, as income measurement 
for poor households might be more imprecise than for richer households, a non-parametric approach will 
be applied as well. This approach will not only relax the assumption of a a	being constant, but also allow 
the convergence parameter to vary by initial income. 
In part 5, the methodology outlined above will be applied to four different panel studies. In particular, using 
the panel data from the USA should allow to compare the estimates of β and a with well-established 
validation studies and therefore test the functionality of the approach.  
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3.4. Data  
To understand poverty dynamics while controlling for measurement error, household panel data is needed. 
The four panel studies used in this chapter are the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) – South Africa; 
Panel of Socioeconomic Characterization “La Encuesta Panel Casen” (EPC) - Chile; the Tanzanian “Natal 
Panel Study” (NPS) and The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) – USA. Since NIDS will not only be 
used to set the benchmark results for this chapter, but also be part of the main analysis for chapter three, it 
should be discussed in more detail than the other data sets.  
3.4.1. South African Panel Data 
The main rationale for using NIDS is its coverage of the entire country. After the release of the new 2014-
2015 data set, NIDS now contains a four wave panel spanning a time period of seven years. NIDS is quite 
large, including 26,776 completed individual interviews in 2008 (wave 1), 28,519 individual observations for 
2010-2011 (wave 2) 32,571 successful interviews in 2012 (wave3) and 37,396 individual observations for 
2014-15 (wave 4). For now we will concentrate on households observed in wave 1, wave 2 and wave 3 
(leaving out wave 4 information for most of the main analysis) to obtain the largest possible amount of 
observed households. As with all panel studies, there is some attrition between the different waves. Yet, in 
comparison to the second wave, wave 3 has negative attrition rates (see De Villiers et al. 2013). That means 
that out of 26,776 core household members, 22,058 have been observed again in wave two and 22,375 in 
wave three. Attrition among the richest decile is 41.59% and is especially common among the white 
population (50.31%), which is more than three times higher than attrition among black Africans (13.39%). 
As richer households drop out at a higher rate, an analysis with the resulting unbalanced sample would 
incorrectly indicate income convergence towards the mean. To address this issue, the analysis uses a 
balanced sample and with specific panel weights to adjust for attrition. The balanced sample of individuals 
that appear in all three waves consist of 18,826 individual observations. However, since we are interested in 
household income dynamics we will only households, for those the household head stayed the same for all 
three waves30. Limiting the sample to such households will leave us with 2,786 core households. 
3.4.2. Chile Panel Data 
The EPC is part of the representative national panel (Casen) containing four waves from 2006-2009. In 
2006 there were 30,104 successful interviews, of those originally interviewed 23,353 (77.6%) could be found 
 
Arguably this definition of a household is very restrictive. Therefore, to control for the robustness of the results two 
less strict definitions of a core household were used as well. First, keeping all households where the original household 
head could be follwed over three periods. Households that moved location or where the household head changed in 
the survey would still be included. Using these criteria we end up with about 4000 household observations. Second, 
the sample was further increased by following all households that had three panel observations (wave 1- wave 3) 
irrespective if the household head could be followed or not. However, we now observe households splitting into more 
than 1 original household from wave 1. Therefore, in case the original household (w1_hhid) splits into two or three 
households (w2_hhid) the information from the variable “w2_stayer”/ “w3_stayer” was used. These variables contain 
the information if members stayed or left the household in-between waves. As Finn et al. (2012) have shown “stayers” 
seem to experience smaller income changes on average. We therefore followed the household half that reported to be 
a “stayer”. With this procedure 4,644 households could be identified having 3 wave panel information. 
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again in 2007, 20155 (67%) in 2008 and 18,154 (60.3%) in 2009. As for NIDS we will only use the first 3 
waves to maximise the number of households observed in consecutive 3 years. For these three waves 5,560 
households can be observed. It is important to note that this is the only study which contains yearly data 
which will impact the interpretation of the mobility coefficients. 
3.4.3. Tanzania Panel Data 
For Tanzania the NPS containing information for the years 2008/2009; 2010/2011 and 2012/2013 was 
used for the analysis. The NPS is another large national representative household survey containing 
Tanzania mainland and Tanzania Zanzibar. In the first round it contained information on 16,709 individuals 
living in 3280 households. Even though in the second round, 20,559 individuals in 3,924 households were 
interviewed, this chapter will only make use of the 3027 households with income information for all three 
waves. That means attrition for the NPS was very low with only 7.3%. In addition, it is important to note 
that two-third of the households in the sample are rural. This is the highest share of rural observations for 
all four countries.  
3.4.4. USA Panel Data 
Finally, to test the reliability of the GMM approach and to compare the income mobility and measurement 
error estimates from the three developing country data sets, the PSID from the USA was analysed. The 
PSID has the advantage of being the longest available national socio-economic panel and numerous studies 
and working papers on income mobility are available to compare the results from this study. For the analysis 
the data from the years 2007, 2009 and 2011 were chosen, totalling 6,534 household information for these 
three waves.  
 
3.5. Results 
In this part the results from the empirical analysis are given. The focus will be on obtaining the true estimates 
of  the speed of convergence and a an estimate of measurement error. The variable of interest is the 
change in real per capita household income from all sources. Household income and not earnings was 
chosen to ensure comparability of the results between countries and data sets. E.g. for Tanzania – as for 
many developing countries -earnings estimates are only available for a very small part of the population and 
the numbers are less reliable than total household income31. Second, total per capita household income 
might be a better estimate of economic status if households in developing countries are large and only a few 
household members have regular earnings income. 
 
31 Household income, still might be influenced by seasonal income especially in Tanzania.  
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3.5.1. Income convergence in the USA  
Table 2 columns (1)-(6) show the regression coefficients which represent z - z introduced in part 3. These 
will then compared to the coefficient from the 2SLS estimator presented in Column (7). Column (1) and (2) 
give the convergence coefficients that correspond to z and z. They indicate that 30.2% of the income 
gap between any two households in the USA would be disappear between 2007 and 2009 and another 25.5% 
of the income gap would be eliminated between 2009 and 2011. This would imply that the half-life of the 
income gap in the USA is somewhere between 3.8 and 4.7 years respectively. This is similar to the findings 
by the study of Fields et al. (2003), giving convergence coefficients that are indicating half-life convergence 
between 0.7 years for Venezuela, 1 year for Spain and about 4.2 years for South Africa. However, recent 
findings from Chetty at al. (2014) using administrative data and calculating intergenerational mobility 
between sons and fathers come up with an intergenerational elasticity of coefficient of 0.45 which can be 
translated to a convergence coefficient of -0.55 and a half-time gap of about 26 years.32 This suggests that 
the naïve convergence estimates are most likely biased downwardly by measurement error in household 
income as shown in part 2. Not surprisingly IV estimates of z given in column (7) provides a much lower 
coefficient of only -0.0543 implying a half-time gap of 24.7 years.  
 
Table 2: Regression coefficients for USA (PSID) income regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS estimation of ¥O - ¥´ IV estimation 
µb µb µb b  b µb µb µb
b (''S  (''! ('"S ' SS


''  ''' '' ''' "'  
b  ('S   ('!'SS  (''SSS
 ''!   ''   ''' '
µb      ('SS 
     ''' 
KU&*%&* S !S '  S  !S ''' '!SSS
' '" ''"! '! ' ''" ''!
$G+%*/U& D'" D D D D D D
^(_-%G$. '! '' ''' '"' ''' ' ''
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Source: PSID years 2007, 2009, 2011) 
 
To examine the internal consistency of the coefficient estimates provided in Table 2, the predicted values 
for eachz¶, for the case that z represents the true convergence parameter  and a   (income is 
measured without error), are given in Table 3 row 2. None of the predicted values seem to be near the 
observed valuesz¶, indicating that the case of =-0.302 and a   does not provide internal consistent 
regression coefficients. Another way to test if there is no measurement error (implyinga  ), is given in 
row 4 in Table 3. Here the value for  was calculated using the formula of Table 1 column 2 – the case of 
no measurement error. The estimates of  are reaching from -0.039 to -0.726 rejecting the hypothesis of 
a   for the possibility to observe consistent. Therefore, the informal method seems to show that 
 
32 Given that the children in the sample where about 30 years old. 
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measurement error is needed to explain the income convergence process, although it cannot be formally 
tested in this way. 
 
Table 3: Regression coefficients and implied parameter values for USA 
·¸ ·O ·P ·¹ ·º ·» ·¼ ·´ 
]*/[%*$.+%,-$U½¾¿
(''S ('S (''! ('"S ' S ('!'SS ('SS
'' ''! ''' '' ''' " ''  '''
ÀG$./X*$.+%,-$U½¾¿/½Á 
''%&.I   ('' ('' (' (' '''' ('' ('
ÀG$./X*$.+%,-$U½¾¿/½Á 
''%&.I  '!! ('' ('' (''! ('" '" ('" ('"
Â%,-$U½Á/[W,/$.\¾¿
/½I   ('' (' (''" ('" ÃQ ('!' ('!
Â%,-$U½Á/[W,/$.\¾¿
/½I  '!! ('' ' (''! (''! ('' " (' ('! 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Source: own calculation) 

In a next step, allowing for measurement error new values for β and α were estimated from equation [7] 
obtaining estimates of :  '' andaÄ  '!!. These values where then used to predict the values of 
z¶ in row 3 in Table 3. Even though, these predictions don’t fit the observed values in column 1 perfectly, 
they are still significantly closer than the non-measurement error predictions in shown in column 2. Similarly, 
allowing for measurement error the implied β from each regression coefficient with ana  '!!, are much 
smaller and lie in a more narrow range between 0.11 and -0.178. Thus, allowing for measurement error gives 
much more consistent estimates from the informal approach and significant lower estimates for the 
convergence coefficient β.  
A more efficient and formal approach to estimate β and α is the system GMM estimator. Here the regression 
coefficients z - z from Table 2 are used to solve equation [8] without putting any restriction on the value 
of a and . The results in column 1 of Table 4 show a β of -0.053 which implies that 5% of the income gap 
will be eliminated between each wave. This is very close to results of equation [7] as well as the IV estimates 
but only a sixth, respectively a fifth of the naïve OLS estimates z and z. The results are highly significant 
and have much smaller standard errors than the two other estimators. In addition, the GMM estimator 
allows the formal testing of the validity of the over-identifying restrictions. The J-statistic of 0 and a p-value 
of 1 implies that all five linearly independent regression coefficients are solved in a way that is internally 
consistent. 
Given a speed of convergence of 5%, the new resulting half-life gap for the USA, would be about 26.7 years, 
which overlaps very much with the findings of Chetty at al. (2014) and is in line with other studies from the 
US using the PSID (Solon, 1999, 2002). Second, the estimated a of 0.785 implies that 21.5% of variation in 
household income can be explained by measurement error and 78.5% is due to actual variation. A reliability 
statistic of 0.78 again is in line with other validation literature for the US e.g. Abowd & Stinson (2013) who 
find that self-reported earnings of US workers have a reliability statistic of 0.7. 
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Table 4: GMM estimates for US income dynamics 
   (1) (2) 
  ('''SSS (''SSS

 '''!"" ''''
a  '! SSS 
  ''" (
$G+%*/U&  D! D!
Å(*$**%*/*/X  ' "
W(+%,-$   '! 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Source PSID years 2007, 2009, 2011) 
 
As a last step, restricting α=1 will estimate the best fit for β assuming no measurement error. Column 2 of 
Table 4 shows that the estimate of -0.102 is twice the size of the earlier estimate but still much smaller than 
obtained by the naïve OLS regression. Yet, the J-statistic and p-value of 0.748 rejects the hypothesis of no 
measurement error since the over-identifying restrictions don’t give a consistent estimation of β. 
3.5.2. Income convergence in South Africa, Chile and Tanzania 
Upward economic mobility is one of the most important indicators for economic development. However, 
most estimates of economic mobility rely on the assumption of no measurement error of income, an 
assumption which has to be rejected for most panel sets, as shown for the US in the previous section. As a 
result, conventional income convergence coefficients and the resulting half-life estimates are overestimated 
and underestimated respectively. Yet, the results from the last section for the USA have shown that the 
GMM estimator produces  anda estimations which are more efficient and in line with published validation 
studies. Therefore, the approach will now be applied for panel studies from South Africa, Chile and 
Tanzania.  
First, the regression coefficients z - z for all three countries are produced in Table B1-B3 in the Appendix. 
For South Africa the estimates of z and z obtained from regressing µb on b and µb on b are both 
about -0.25, which would imply that half of the income gap between the richest and poorest South African 
household ought to be eliminated within 4.8 years. For Chile z andz are equal to -0.362 and -0.449. 
Transferred to half-life estimates this would indicate that after only 1.5 or even 1.2 years half of the income 
gap disappears. Given these rather different coefficient estimates between the two waves, the maintained 
assumption of a constant convergence coefficients maintained by our GMM estimator may be problematic. 
The naïve convergence coefficients for Tanzania are -0.536 and -0.485, indicating half-life estimates 1.8 and 
2.1 years. Even though all three countries might experience some income mobility these high mobility 
estimates may well be symptomatic of the presence of measurement error.  
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Table 5 reports theand a estimates from the GMM model for the three countries.33 All convergence 
coefficients are much smaller than the conventional estimates suggest. For South Africa the conventional 
approach over-estimates by more than a factor of 4 in comparison with the GMM estimate of -0.0590. 
Column 3 shows that Chile’s best estimate for  is -0.0747 and that the naïve convergence coefficients 
might have been inflated by a factor of 5 to 6. Tanzania’s β equals to -0.114. These results imply new half-
life approximations of 22.7 years for South Africa, 8.9 years for Chile and 11.4 years for Tanzania. All 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level and estimated highly efficient, as can be observed by the small 
standard errors. 
In terms of data reliability, the GMM model provides estimates between 0.8 for South Africa and 0.634 for 
Chile and even 0.552 for Tanzania. This indicates that 20% of variation in reported household income is 
due to measurement error in South Africa, but about 36% in Chile and 45% in Tanzania. This means, while 
the data reliability for the US, Chile and Tanzania correspond to their levels of economic development. 
Comparing the results between the two African economies it seem like the data reliability parameter is 
significantly higher for South Africa than for Tanzania. There are two interpretations for why this might be 
the case. First, a purely technical reason is that South Africa’s income distribution is much more unequal 
than that of Tanzania. In this case, given the same absolute level of measurement error, the data reliability 
parameter α would be larger for South Africa, due to the larger variation of bce. Hence, at a given level of 
relative income misreporting, South Africa will therefore have a higher reliability estimator. Second, it might 
be that Tanzania’s household income process is more influenced by shocks due to its larger share of 
subsistence economic activity. 
 
Table 5: GMM estimates for South African, Chile and Tanzania income dynamics 
 South Africa Chile Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Á (''"'SSS (''  SSS (''!SSS ('SSS ('SSS (''"SSS
 ''! ''' '' " '''' '''  ''' "
I ' 'SSS  'SSS  'SSS 
 ''" ( ''  ( ''! (
$G+%*/U& D!!' D!!' D  D  D    D   
Å(*$**%*/*/X '" ! "    !
W(+%,-$ '"" ' ''' ' ' '
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Source: NIDS, EPC and NPS panels) 
 
Next, the calculated J-statistic allows us to test for the validly of the over-identifying restrictions. For South 
Africa the J-statistic of 0.249 with a p-value of 0.969 indicates that the GMM estimator can calculate all five 
linearly independent regression coefficients in a way that is internally highly consistent. Similarly, consistency 
 
For South Africa the GMM estimates using a larger household sample, relaxing the definition of core households 
can be found in Table B4 (in the Appendix).
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can’t be rejected for Tanzania given a p-value far above 0.05. Only for Chile the hypothesis that all 
coefficients can be estimated by the GMM model in an internal consistent way has to be rejected with a p-
value of 0.001. However, this might be due to the very different coefficient estimates between the two 
waves, which violates the constant convergence hypothesis. Finally, column (2), (4) and (6) all highly reject 
the assumption of no measurement error in the data sets. 
To check for the robustness of the results, all regression coefficients have also been calculated for sub-
samples of the data, excluding 0.1 % of largest income changes at the top and 0.1% at the bottom, in all 
countries. As expected the results in Table 6 show that the data-reliability coefficient a increases for all 
countries when excluding the largest outliers. In particular, for the USA a is 0.911 implying that 91% of the 
variation in log household income is now due to variation in actual income and only 9% remains due to 
measurement error. Furthermore, the gap between the naïve and the GMM approach is much smaller with 
a regression coefficient for z of -0.187 versus the GMM coefficient of -0.085. Still even this new estimates 
show that measurement error will inflate the naïve regression coefficients by more than twofold for the US, 
about three times for South Africa and Tanzania and four times for Chile.  
 
Table 6: Regression coefficients for all countries excluding extreme values 
 USA South Africa Chili Tanzania 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Full 
Sample 
No 
extreme 
values 
Full 
Sample 
No extreme 
values Full Sample 
No extreme 
values 
Full 
Sample 
No 
extreme 
values 
µbc µbc µbc  µbc µbc µbc µbc µbc
ÆÇb (''S (' !SS ('SSS ('''SSS ('SSS ('SSS ('SSS ('SSS
'' ''' ''! ''' '' ''' '' '''
ÈÉÉ (''SSS ('' SSS (''"SSS (''!SSS (''!SSS (''! SSS ('SSS ('SSS
'''!"" ''' ''! ''! '' " '' '''  ''
ÈÉÉa '! SSS '"SSS ' 'SSS '  SSS 'SSS '!SSS 'SSS ''SSS
''" ''  ''" ''! ''  '' ''! ''
Å(*%*/*/X ' ' '"  " !!  
W(+%,-$   '"" '! ''' ''  ' '!
$G+%*/U& ! D'! D!!' D" D  D"! D    D! 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Source: PSID, NIDS, EPC and NPS panels) 
 
3.5.3. Results from non-parametric approach  
In general, the results of the GMM estimator have highlighted the problem of measurement error in income 
mobility estimates for all countries. They also question if high transition rates in and out of poverty observed 
for many developing countries (e.g. Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000), are due to 
true income shocks or simple measurement error. To find out whether or not measurement error affects 
income observations of poor and rich households in the same way this section makes use of the non-
parametric approach which is also less restrictive on the form of the measurement error, allowing for  and 
a to vary with the income levels. 
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Figures 1-4 show that the non-parametric estimates of  increases with initial income levels for each of the 
four countries considered. This indicates that poorer households are more income mobile, while the 
incomes of richer households are more stable. However, while  estimates ranges in relatively narrow ranges 
of about -0.09 to -0.04 in the USA, and -0.15 to -0.8 in Chile, this rate of convergence is much more varied 
across income groups in South Africa (-0.14 to -0.03) and particularly in Tanzania (-0.50 for poor households 
and -0.10 for rich households). This means income convergence strongly depends on initial income in 
Tanzania. On the other hand, the income reliability statistic aseems to show quite high values (around 0.75) 
at the top and the bottom and of the income distribution and more measurement error for average 
households (around 0.65) in Tanzania. For the three other countries measurement error predictions are 
again larger for poor households and lower with increasing household income. This relationship seems to 
be particularly steep in South Africa, with a share of measurement error explaining household income 
variation up to 40% for poor households and only 5% for the richest ones. 
 
Figure 1: Nonparametric estimates of b and ab for the USA 

(Source: PSID years 2007, 2009, 2011) 

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Figure 2: Nonparametric estimates of b and ab for South Africa 

(Source: NIDS waves 1-3) 

Figure 3: Nonparametric estimates of Á\ and I\ for Chile 

(Source: EPC waves 1-3) 

-
.
15
-
.
12
-
.
09
-
.
06
-
.
03
β
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
1
α
-4 -2 0 2 4
Wave 1 per capita income
α β
-
.
15
-
.
12
-
.
09
-
.
06
-
.
03
β
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
.
9
α
-2 -1 0 1 2
Wave 1 per capita income
α β
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Figure 4: Nonparametric estimates of b and ab for Tanzania 

(Source: NPS wave 1-3) 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
Upward economic mobility continues to be one of the most important indicators for economic 
development. However, the results of this chapter have shown that without controlling for measurement 
error naïve OLS regressions produce convergence coefficients that are unrealistically large and that are 
inconsistent with other moments in a three wave panel dataset. In order to quantify the effect of 
measurement error in household income data and to obtain less biased  estimates a newly developed GMM 
estimator was applied to four large national panel studies. The results for the USA imply that the naïve OLS 
approach overestimates income mobility by a factor of 5-6, while the GMM model estimates a convergence 
coefficient that is internally consistent and translates to a half-life income convergence gap of about 26.7 
years which is in line with previous validation studies.  
We also apply this method to three developing countries: South Africa, Tanzania and Chile. Our results 
indicate that the hypothesis of no measurement error can be rejected for all the countries we consider and 
the a estimates imply that the share of income variation that is due to actual income changes is only 55% 
for Tanzania, 63% for Chile, 79% for the USA and 80% for South Africa. Therefore, while the data reliability 
for the US, Chile and Tanzania correspond to their levels of economic development, South Africa’s data 
reliability appears to be unexpectedly high. For the convergence coefficient the GMM model provides a 
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new  of -0.059 or a half-life gap of 22.7 years for South Africa, a  of -0.075 or a half-life gap of 8.9 years 
for Chile and a  of -0.114 or a half-life gap of 11.4 years for Tanzania. These results show that initial 
estimates were overestimated by a factor 4-6. 
Finally, using a nonparametric approach that allows  and a to vary with the initial income levels shows 
that the convergence coefficient is indeed larger for poorer households in all countries. This is particularly 
true for Tanzania and – to a lesser extent – for South Africa, the households at the bottom end of the 
income distribution are much more upwardly mobile than the downward mobility experienced by richer 
households. In a similar way, the data reliability is lower for the poorer households and better for richer 
households in all countries.  
In general, the results of this chapter indicate that income mobility can be substantially overestimated 
without controlling for measurement error. Researchers that use panel data to estimate poverty and 
economic mobility should therefore be concerned to use appropriate estimators that can deal with the 
problem of measurement error in household income. On a more positive note, even if initial estimates were 
overly optimistic the results still show significant convergence for all countries, implying that households 
below the average are growing faster and catching up with the richer households.
 
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Chapter 4:  
The effect of  neighbourhoods and school quality on 
educational and labour market outcomes 

4.1. Introduction 
The extent to which family, neighbourhood and the quality of schooling can explain differences in socio-
economic outcomes is an important question that has produced several studies in the past (e.g. Card and 
Krueger, 1992; Case and Deaton, 1999; Case and Yogo, 1999; Solon et al., 2000; and Altonji and Mansfield, 
2011). In light of recent findings by Lam et al. (2011) that movement through secondary schooling is still 
predominantly along racial lines, the effect of special location and schooling outcomes is a particularly 
important research question for South Africa. In addition, South Africa provides an interesting setting to 
observe neighbourhood and school effects, due to its unique history and sharp differences between wealth 
and school quality in different neighbourhoods, which were shaped under the apartheid regime (Case and 
Yogo, 1999). Given South Africa’s high income inequality levels, making sure that child from poor socio-
economic background and former disadvantaged areas also receive quality education is essential to 
transform the education system into a resource for increased opportunity and racial equity.  
Because of the strong correlation between family wealth, school choice, neighbourhood and schooling 
outcomes, it is very difficult to disentangle the relative importance of each factor. Previous studies analysing 
school and neighbourhood effects didn’t have the necessary data to observe school quality, neighbourhood 
wealth and household characteristics at the same time. Furthermore, since these factors are highly correlated, 
imperfect measurement of one will make the other factors seem more important than they really are. The 
only way in which the relative importance of these education and wage determinants can be accurately 
measured is to find more reliable measures of each of these factors.  
This chapter makes an important contribution to the literature by building a model which explains schooling 
and labour market outcomes, given more informative measures of students’ location, parents’ background 
as well as school quality measures. To do so, the National Income Dynamics Study will be linked to the 
master list of schools in South Africa, as well as to Census 2011 community data. Spatial linking of the 
Census 2011 will allow us to construct a new wealth index for 85,000 small areas and identify precisely the 
neighbourhood wealth of each household and school in the data. It will be shown that this wealth measure 
for each school is an excellent proxy for school quality, which explains schooling outcomes more accurately 
than the official school quintiles provided by the department of education (this is true at least in metropolitan 
regions). Finally, the data allows us to observe whether a child is going to school in the same neighbourhood 
he/she is living and the actual distance he/she travels to school every day. 
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Having constructed the data in this unique way, this chapter will try to answer some questions that have 
important policy implications. How large are family background effects relative to school quality effects 
when explaining schooling outcomes? What is the effect of sending a child from the poorest 
neighbourhoods to the best schools in the region? Are there long-run effects of going to a high quality 
school that determine university enrolment and an earnings premium? While this chapter will show large 
differences in education outcomes depending on the quality of the school, it can also demonstrate that even 
children from the poorest neighbourhood would perform well if they went to these high performing 
schools. However, given the limited number of quality schools in the country and the financial as well as 
transport constraints faced by the poor, only about 10% of the poorest 60% of children actually manage to 
get high quality education. Hence, to achieve more equal education outcomes, the quality of schools in the 
poor neighbourhoods would need to be improved. This would have large effects, as it can be shown that 
there are indirect effects as well as a direct premium for quality education in the labour market.  
The structure of this chapter will be as follows: first, a short background and literature review is given, 
second, the three main data sets and the merging process with which the datasets were linked will be 
explained, and descriptive statistics and maps are provided. Lastly, a regression analysis for education 
outcomes and labour market earnings is performed. Finally, a conclusion about the findings are drawn. 
 
4.2. Background and Literature 
One of apartheid’s enduring legacies is the large inequality of education opportunity for children from 
different racial and socio-economic backgrounds. This situation is rooted in the apartheid school system 
that created separate departments for children of different race groups: White, Indian, Coloured and Black 
(Hill, 2016). The result was four school systems within South Africa with vastly different resources34, 
curricula and learning environments. While transforming the education system to achieve equal opportunity 
has been an important policy of the post-apartheid agenda, the institutional memory of the former school 
departments are still causing significant differences between schools along racial lines (e.g. Van der Berg, 
2007; Van der Berg et al., 2011; Taylor et al., 2013; and Yamauchi, 2011). In particular former black schools 
(also called township schools in urban areas) have not seen much racial mixing and are still under-resourced 
with numerous administrative problems. In the worst case, the situation at these schools can be described 
as a culture of learning where teaching is almost non-existent (Msila, 2005). By contrast, former white and 
Indian schools are now much more racially diverse, although not socio-economically diverse, due to their 
fee-charging structure (Yamauchi, 2011).  
Today, because of the exit option and due to new laws stating that no child can be excluded from a school 
for financial reasons (Hunter, 2015), in theory any parent is allowed to send their children to former Model 
 
34 The situation in the 1960s was that black students received only one-tenth of the school funding as white children 
(Hunter, 2015). 
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C schools (formerly white schools). However, during apartheid, different population groups were also 
segregated in separate residential areas which means good schools are still located in selected areas 
(Yamauchi, 2011). As a results, de Kadt et al. (2014) find for the “Birth to Twenty cohort study” of 1,428 
children in Soweto-Johannesburg that over a third of them travel more than 6km to school, 60% leave the 
suburb they live in and only 18% attend their nearest school. However, household-level financial constraints 
caused by schooling fees, additional transport and time costs will prevent the poorest children from going 
to better schools in practice. A qualitative study by Msila (2005) interviewed parents currently sending their 
children to historically black schools. She observes that mostly distance and economic reasons prevent 
parents from sending their children to former Model C schools. In terms of racial patterns, another study 
by Hill (2015) show that coloured families in Cape Town are 50% more likely to send their children to 
“better” schools than black families. 
Because of the strong correlation between family wealth, school choice, neighbourhood and peer effects, it 
is very difficult to disentangle the relative importance of each factor in schooling and labour market 
outcomes. That is, do schools produce different outcomes because they influence student performance or 
because they were able (or failed) to attract students that would have succeeded regardless of the school 
chosen? Similarly, do children in rich neighbourhoods perform well at school because of the neighbourhood 
they live in, the school they go to or the family they come from? The answer to this question is of particular 
importance due to its policy implications (Antonji and Mansfield, 2011). In the case where most of the 
variation of learning outcomes can be explained by parents’ socio-economic status (SES) and their 
involvement in students’ learning behaviour, increasing school funding of the poorest schools will be 
unlikely to improve student outcomes. On the other hand, if parents’ SES is only significant because it is a 
proxy for the quality of the school their children go to, then improving school quality is likely to have large 
effects, in particular for the poorest students (Altonji and Mansfield, 2011).  
To solve the correlation and identification problem, the seminal study by Solon et al. (2000) used a variance 
decomposition approach to bound the proportion of socio-economic outcomes that can be attributed to 
disparities in family and neighbourhood background by using the correlation between siblings and unrelated 
neighbours. The neighbourhood correlation captures the pure neighbour effect but also family traits because 
of the sorting mechanism and therefore is an upper bound35. Previous studies adapting the Solon et al. 
(2000) methodology found relatively high sibling correlations in brother income and education for China, 
the US, UK and Germany and smaller effects for the Nordic European countries (e.g. Björklund et al., 2004; 
Raaum et al., 2006; Lindahl, 2011; Eriksson and Zhang, 2012; Nicoletti and Rabe, 2013; or Schnitzlein, 
2014). The proportion that can be explained by disparities in neighbourhood background seem to be nearly 
zero for income and small for education. Other studies for the US that focused on school quality and its 
 
he sorting mechanism means that parents with similar characteristics will move into the same neighbourhoods. 
Therefore, there is a strong correlation between parents’ characteristics and neighbourhood wealth.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


importance in reducing disadvantage from one generation to the next, also found very small effects (e.g. 
Jenning et al., 2015).  
This literature is in sharp contrast to studies by Card and Krueger (1992), Case and Deaton (1999), and Case 
and Yogo (1999) who find for the USA as well as South Africa that school quality measured by pupil/teacher 
ratios have large and significant effects on the return to schooling for black men. Hanushek, Lavy, and 
Hitomi (2008) show that children in Egypt were more likely to drop out of low quality primary schools, 
which is similar to findings by Harbison and Hanushek (1992) who observe a reduction in repetition rates 
for Brazilian primary students when going to high quality schools. Another study by Glewwe et al. (2014) 
show that whether or not there are differences in learning between children from different backgrounds at 
the same school depends on the type of students and the country context.  
There are at least two possible reasons for the contrasting results in the literature on the role of school 
quality. First, while the first bunch studies following the approach of Solon et al. (2000) explicitly try to 
disentangle the effect of neighbourhoods, family and school quality by using sibling correlations, the later 
might not efficiently separate family and school quality effects. Hence, those studies finding large schooling 
effects might be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity due to family effects. The other possibility is that 
as Case and Yogo (1999) rightly argue: “schooling quality should matter in countries like South Africa, where 
resources were distributed very unevenly between regions in the past” but these difference are not large 
enough in Western societies to matter. In the specific case of South Africa where we do know do that there 
are basically two school systems – those of the former white and those of the former back schools -  we 
should definitely observe some quality differences in schools. Given the close proximity of poor and rich 
neighbourhoods and the clear distinction between poor and rich schools and children travelling in between 
these boundaries, this study should share light on the role of parental background, neighbourhood, and 
school quality. Furthermore, due to data constraints most studies, except for a view like Altonji and 
Mansfield (2011) or Jenning et al. (2015), focused on short run effects and didn’t observe the long-term 
impact of school quality, family and neighbourhood background. Again, having long-run panel data this 
study will be able to address this issue. 
 
4.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
To analyse the effect of neighbourhood and quality schooling the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) 
is used. In this part, it will be explained how NIDS is merged with Census 2011 community spatial data and 
the master list of schools in South Africa. Some descriptive information and maps of the merged data will 
be provided. 
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4.3.1. Census 2011 data 
The Census 2011 data is provided by Statistics South Africa (STATSSA). The primary sampling units (PSUs) 
were the 103,576 Census enumeration areas (EA) (see STATSA, 2012b). To obtain detailed information on 
the neighbourhood level the analysis was based on the “Small area layer” (SAL) from the Census 2011 
Community Profiles which STATSSA provides in SuperCROSS. SAL are the second lowest geographical 
areas (after the EA level) in which the country is divided for the Census design. In a second step the 
information from the SAL were aggregated to weighted averages (using population size) to get the “Sub 
place” (SP) information. STATSSA (2012a) defines SP as “the second (lowest) level of the place name 
category, namely a suburb, section or zone of an (apartheid) township, smallholdings, village, sub village, 
ward or informal settlement”. The Census community data provides information for about 85,000 SAL and 
22,000 SP in South Africa. However, our analysis showed that there are SALs which do not have sufficient 
household information given their population size.36 For those 629 SALs no wealth index was constructed 
but rather the weighted averages from the SP were given. Using SAL level information therefore has the 
advantage of identifying data irregularities we would not observe on the aggregate SP level and having 
smaller and more even distributed area samples to construct a wealth index using principal component 
analysis (PCA).
An example of SP and SAL maps can be found in the Appendix (Figure C1). For dense areas like the City 
of Cape Town each SP is divided into about 16 new SALs. Between 0 and 111,937 individuals live in a SP. 
However the median size is about 5,400 individuals living in 1,500 households for SP and about 580 
individuals living in 160 households in a SAL.
One of the largest challenges in this approach comes from the fact that the data is provided on community 
level rather than household level. Therefore, all variables in SuperCROSS are given as total counts (e.g. the 
number of households with access to clean water in that particular SAL). These totals were transformed to 
percentages e.g. the percentage of households with access to clean water in that SAL. The wealth index was 
then constructed using PCA analysis for a set of variables, namely household income (in brackets), education 
(for everyone age 25-64), labour market status, household assets and household services. The household 
income is given in 12 brackets ranging from “R1-4800” to “R2457601 or more” and “no income”. The four 
lowest income categories and the highest five categories were grouped and aggregated together. Similarly 
education was grouped to “No education”, “Some primary education”, “Secondary education”, “Matric” 
and “Higher education”. In addition only education levels for the age group 25-64 were chosen to observe 
completed education and not enrolment. For a complete list of all variables used to construct the wealth 
index, see Table C1 in the Appendix. 
Figure C2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the wealth index. To make the wealth index comparable 
to the official school quintiles provided by the department of basic education (DBE), quintiles of wealth 
were generated using the population size of each SAL and SP respectively as weights. Wealth quintile 
 
36 For more detailed information on the net Census coverage error see (STATSSA, 2012b). 
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information has been merged with the national school master list and NIDS learner data using GPS 
coordinates and GIS software as described below. 
4.3.2. Master list of schools 
The master list of schools in South Africa provided by the DBE has detailed information for all 25,827 
schools of the country, including ex-department, quintile, learner-teacher ratios and GIS information which 
are used for the matching process37. The upper panels of Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the newly calculated 
neighbourhood wealth quintiles and the average matric examination results for 2014 for the municipalities 
of Cape Town and Johannesburg.38 
The neighbourhood wealth quintiles are illustrated by colours: green for the richest and red for the poorest 
areas. Similarly, the matric examination results for 2014 are also divided into quintiles and coloured in green 
for best and red for worst performing schools. As mentioned before, due to the legacy of apartheid there is 
a strong correlation between the neighbourhood a school is based in and the average school results it 
produces, which clearly can be seen in the maps.  
In addition, the bottom panels of Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate how racially segregated South Africa still 
is today. That is, there appears to be some clustering for each race group where their share of the SAL 
population exceeds more than 50%. Hence, given the institutional memory of the schooling departments 
from the apartheid regime and the clear racial separation, we would expect some form of omitted variable 
bias in any schooling model which doesn’t sufficiently control for household and schooling location. 
 
 
  
 
37 For more information on the master list of schools in South Africa see Van Wyk (2015). 
38 For the overall picture of the metropolitan regions Cape Town; Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni; as well as 
eThekwini see Figure C2, Figure C3, and Figure C4 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 1: Neighbourhood wealth quintiles, geographic race distribution and matric 2014 examination results in 
metropolitan Cape Town  
Note: The colours in the bottom panel indicate a share larger than 50% for a particular race group in that SAL in the 
Census 2011 data. In addition, the average matric 2014 examination results per school are displayed.  
(Source: Census 2011 and DBE school data) 
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Figure 2: Neighbourhood wealth quintiles, geographic race distribution and matric 2014 examination results in 
metropolitan Johannesburg  
 
Note: The colours in the bottom panel indicate a share larger than 50% for a particular race group in that SAL in the 
Census 2011 data. In addition, the average matric 2014 examination results per school are displayed.  
(Source: Census 2011 and DBE school data) 
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4.3.3. NIDS 
Besides the publicly available data, NIDS also provides secured data on GPS household location, as well as 
the names of all the schools children are going to or the last school a respondent went to before leaving the 
school system. Using the name of the school, as well as the household location, it was possible to merge in 
further information (containing GPS data for each school) from the master list of schools using fuzzy 
matching.39 Having GPS coordinates for all households as well as schools makes it possible to link the new 
neighbourhood wealth index from the Census 2011 community data to the household and school location 
using the SAL and SP maps described in the last section. This data also allows us to calculate the distance 
to the closest school, as well as determining the actual school students attended.40  
The maps shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (and Figure C3, C4 and C5 in the Appendix) all paint the picture 
of municipalities where poor and rich communities lie in close proximity to each other. They also show the 
historic placement of well-funded former model C (white) schools in the formal areas close to the town 
centres. Given the findings of previous studies that most parents would like to send their children to former 
model C schools (e.g. de Kadt et al., 2014; Msila, 2015) we should observe at least some children in NIDS 
from the poorest neighbourhoods commuting to richer former model C schools in town. Indeed, Table 1 
shows that a substantial part of the student population from the poorest 40% of neighbourhoods are 
traveling to schools that lie in wealthier areas than their own household location. In addition, Table 2 and 
Table 3 give the wealth of the school and student location by race group. While black students 
predominantly live and go to school in the poorest two neighbourhood quintiles, white children live in the 
top two quintiles and almost always attend the richest schools. Interestingly, it seems that Indian and to 
some extent coloured students usually go to schools based in richer areas than their own.41 These descriptive 
findings can be formally tested in a simple OLS model which regresses the difference in the revised school 
quintile to the learner wealth quintile on race, age and a couple of household characteristics (as seen in Table 
C3 in the appendix). It shows that Indian families are more likely to send their children to high quality 
schools. The same is true for parents with more years of education (column 1), parents with matric (column 
2) and households with higher per capita income (column 3). Finally, it appears to be easier for families to 
send their children to richer schools when they reside in urban areas. These results seem to be in line with 
other studies on school choice behaviour for South Africa (e.g. Msila, 2005; de Kadt et al.; 2014; Hill, 2015; 
and Hunter, 2015), providing confidence that the wealth quintiles provide sensible information for further 
analysis.  
 
 
 
39 Fuzzy matching was done using the user written Stata command “reclink”. That means in case no perfect match 
between the key fields in the two datasets exist, the best match, ranked by a matching score, was manually reviewed.
40 This data was accessed through the DataFirst Secure Research Data Centre at the University of Cape Town. 
41 Looking at provincial mobility, Table C2 in the Appendix show that, students from the rural province of the 
Eastern Cape are slightly less mobile in terms of moving between richer and poorer neighbourhoods than children in 
the Western Cape. 
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Table 1: Movement between school and student neighbourhoods for poorest 40%  
  Frequency Percentage 
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This table uses the neighbourhood wealth quintile of the school and of the students’ location from the Census 2011 
community data (Source: Census 2011 and NIDS wave 1-3: age 14-18). 
 
Table 2: Students neighbourhood quintile and race 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
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(Source: NIDS wave 1-3) 
 
Table 3: School quintile and race  
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
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(Source: NIDS wave 1-3) 
 
As stated earlier, the data allows us to calculate the actual distance students travel to school (see Table C4 
and Table C5 in the appendix). White and black learners travel the furthest on average. As expected, given 
the higher number of primary schools, children travel about twice as far in secondary than in primary school 
phase. Interestingly, while rural children have to travel further in the primary school phase, urban children 
have to travel further in the secondary school phase to go to school. Those finding are in line with previous 
studies (e.g. Hunter, 2015) showing that middle class white students are actually driving relatively far to go 
to prestigious good schools in the city, while black students have to travel all the way from the townships 
to the city centre to access quality education. 
 
4.4. Regression analysis 
In this part, the relative importance of family background, neighbourhood effects and school quality will be 
tested. In a first step, it should be determined how well the school neighbourhood performs as a proxy for 
school quality in comparison to the official school quintiles from the DBE. Second, using this proxy for 
school quality and wealth, different regressions on education and labour market outcomes are run on the 
NIDS panel data. 
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 4.4.1. Revised versus official DBE school quintiles 
Using a very simple model, we compare the appropriateness of the two school wealth measures predicting 
the average matric 2014 school results. This should give a first indication on how well the revised school 
wealth measure performs in comparison to the official DBE school quintiles.42 The results in Table 4 
column (1) and column (3) show that for the full sample containing all the schools in the country, both 
measures seem to do similarly well in explaining the variation in average school results with an R2 of 34% 
and 33% respectively. On average, the higher the school quintile the better the school performs. It is worth 
noting that both measures predict that children enrolled in the top quintile school have 11 percentage points 
higher matric examination results than those in the poorest quintile.  
In column (2) and (4) the same specifications are estimated for the metropolitan samples of the cities of 
Cape Town, eThekwini (Durban), Johannesburg and Pretoria. For schools based in these metropolitan 
regions, it appears that the current neighbourhood wealth quintile of a school (column 4) has a significantly 
higher model fit (R2) than the official school quintiles (column 2). In addition, there seem to be larger effects 
of going to quintile 4 and 5 for the revised measure than the official one. Of course, by not controlling for 
household wealth or parent’s education there is a large omitted variable bias in this simple model, so one 
should be cautious of interpreting the coefficient estimates as the causal effects of school resources. That 
is, children living in wealthy neighbourhoods have richer and better educated parents, which should also 
influence a child’s matric performance. However, it is interesting that the coefficient for the school 
neighbourhood wealth index decreases by about two-thirds after controlling for the share of SGB-teachers43, 
which should give a first indication that this measure is a good proxy for the funding and quality of the 
school which may be less vulnerable to measurement error induced attenuation bias.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 The official DBE school quintiles are taken from the master list of schools. The quintiles were developed by the 
DBE in the late 1990s using information from the first Census 1996 to rank the schools based on the wealth of their 
community (van Wyk, 2015). These quintiles are still highly relevant today since they determine the financial support 
a school is entitled to by the government. Second, in the absence of other measures they have been used as a proxy 
for school quality in many studies (e.g. van der Berg, 2008; Spaull and Kotze, 2015). Our revised school quintile 
measure has the advantage that it is based on much newer Census 2011 data, which provides more recent income 
information regarding current wealth in a neighbourhood, particularly in the metropolitan regions
43 SGB-teachers are employed by the school governing body (SGB) and not by the government. SGB-teachers might 
be more motivated to teach than public teachers since they have different contracts and can potentially lose their job. 
In addition, they show that the school has funding capacities to employ these extra teachers. 
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Table 4: Matric 2014 average school results and school quintiles  
 
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Metro 
(3) 
Full sample 
(4) 
Metro 
(5) 
Metro 
(6) 
Metro 
VARIABLES 
Matric 
average 
school 
percentage 
Matric 
average 
school 
percentage 
Matric 
average 
school 
percentage 
Matric 
average 
school 
percentage 
Matric 
average 
school 
percentage 
Matric 
average 
school 
percentage 
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Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  
Number of matric students used as weights (Source: DBE school data) 
 
4.4.2. Short-run education effects 
The advantage of using NIDS is that it not only provides the possibility to test long-term outcomes of 
quality education but also that it is representative on national level. Table 5 reports the pooled OLS 
regression results from NIDS wave 1-3, with years of education reached as the dependent variable for the 
sub-group of 15-18 year olds.44 This age group is of particular interest since most grade repetition and school 
drop-outs occur in grades 9-12 (van Wyk, 2015). All regressions use population weights to adjust for attrition 
and clustered standard errors. In case the youth were observed when they had already left the school system, 
the information of the last school before the dropout has been linked to the individual.  
 
 
 
 
44 Table C6 in the Appendix shows the average household characteristics for age 15-18. Note the high percentage of 
fathers missing, the low mean per capita income and average years of education for parents. 
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Table 5: Pooled OLS regression: reached years of education by age 15-18  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
education  
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
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Not reported province dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(Source NIDS wave 1-3) 
 
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the simple model with just age and school neighbourhood quintiles as 
explanatory variables. In this specification children going to the richest school quintile 5 have attained 
roughly one more year of education than the children from the poorest schools at the same age. As we start 
controlling for race and gender in column (2), parental education in column (3) and household income in 
column (4) the coefficient drops to about one-quarter but remains sizable and statistically significant. There 
is a high correlation between parental education, household income and school wealth quintiles.  
If we estimate the same specifications but replacing the current school quintiles with the DBE school 
quintiles (see Table C7 in the Appendix), the coefficients for school quintiles dummies become insignificant 
and negligible in magnitude once we control for parental education and family income. Hence, it seems that 
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the revised school wealth quintiles provide a more informative measure of school quality than the official 
DBE school quintile measure.  
One obvious issue with using years of education obtained is that this does not necessarily imply actual 
learning but merely years of schooling completed. The true learning gap between the poorest and richest 
schools may be even larger. 45 
It is also noteworthy that there appears to be a large and significant gender effect, causing boys to obtain 
about half a year less education at the same age as girls. Interestingly, there seem to be no remaining 
substantial race effect after controlling for household income, parental education and school characteristics. 
This means black children have the same grade progression if they have similar socio-economic backgrounds 
and attend the same schools as children from the other races. Yet, the average black child has a mother and 
father with about 7 years of education and lives in a household with a mean per capita income of about 
R900, whereas the average white child has parents with about 13 years of education and R7000 mean 
household income. Taking all of this into consideration, an average black child has reached about 1.5 years 
less education at the same age than the average white child. In addition, the outcome variable only measures 
school attainment despite differences in the quality of education the average black and white child receives. 
The finding that South Africa essentially has two very different education systems – one for the poor black 
(and coloured) students going to formerly disadvantaged schools and one for well-off students – that 
produce vastly different schooling results, confirms what have been shown by many previous studies using 
different data sources, e.g. Van der Berg (2007, 2008), Reddy (2011) and Spaull and Kotze (2015). Yet, it 
remains to be persuasively determined how important the neighbourhood effect is relative to school quality 
effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Estimating the same model on an administrative data set for learners from Cape Town and using Western Cape 
Systemic Tests of learner performance shows that the learning gap between the poorest and richest children, going 
to the best and worst schools of Cape Town, are about 1.7 standard deviations which translates to approximately 5 
years’ worth of learning. This demonstrates that the school neighbourhood effect is perhaps even more important in 
determining learning than its effect on schooling attainment. This data is not yet in the public domain and hence 
these regressions were omitted from this thesis. 
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Table 6: Pooled OLS and cluster FE regressions: reached years of education by age 15-18  
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Full sample 
(3) 
Urban sample 
(4) 
Urban sample 
(5) 
Rural sample 
VARIABLES OLS Cluster FE Cluster FE Cluster FE Cluster FE 
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Standard erros in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Not reported province dummies.  
(Source NIDS wave 1-3) 
 
Column (1) of Table 6 controls for the neighbourhood wealth quintile and the distance children travel to 
school. While the neighbourhood the child lives in does not seem to have an additional significant effect, 
the distance to school is a positive and significant determinant of schooling attainment. This could be either 
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because parents’ who send their children to schools further away are also more likely to support their 
offspring with their education in other ways, or because parents are aware of differences in school quality 
that are unobservable to the econometrician.  
To control for other sources of unobserved heterogeneity between neighbourhoods, column (2)-(5) adds 
cluster fixed effects to the model. In column (2) the coefficient for the highest school quintile does increase 
to 0.35 from 0.28 before. The same specification is estimated for the urban sample of NIDS youth in column 
(3). As seen before in Table 5, the school wealth quintile variable seem to explain education outcomes 
particularly well in South African cities. This could be because the difference in schools based in former 
white and Indian neighbourhoods is much larger in comparison to the township schools of former black 
and coloured neighbourhoods within the same city. However, the significant positive coefficient for the 
“difference in school to household quintile” in column (4) implies that students living in the poorest quintile 
neighbourhood but going to a quintile 5 wealth school, would reach about 0.6 year more education than a 
students from the same neighbourhood who are going to the poorest 20% of schools.  
For the rural sample in column (5) no positive effect for such movement between neighbourhoods can be 
observed. Yet, here there appears to be large gains to attending schools further away from home. Finally, in 
Table C8 in the appendix, some additional school quality variables like the share of SGB-teachers at a school, 
dummies for private-or mixed funded schools or the student-teacher ratio are added to the model. The 
coefficient of the school wealth quintile variable stays robustly positive and significant.  
 
4.4.3. Long-run socio-economic effects 
We now consider the effect of quality schooling on university enrolment and labour market earnings. In 
Table 7 university enrolment is regressed on race, age and household characteristics as well as school and 
household neighbourhood quintiles for the age group 18-23. The counterfactual group for those enrolled 
at university are youth directly starting to work after school / unemployed or economic not-active. The 
NIDS panel element was used, to get the actual information from the last school attended and the 
neighbourhood the youth was living at whilst still going to school. In this model, household wealth and 
coming from the richest neighbourhood quintile seem to substantially increase the chances of a youth 
enrolling in university. This finding suggests some kind of credit constraints for poorer students going to 
university, which is not surprising given the high direct costs of university fees. There also seem to be a 
significantly positive effect from the school quality measure, particularly for those whose last school was 
from the highest quintile.  
Black youth seem to be more likely to start some form of tertiary education after controlling for social-
economic status. Limiting the sample to urban black youth, the advantage for the richest quintile remains 
stable, while living in the richest neighbourhoods becomes even more important for black youth. 
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Table 7: Pooled OLS regression: youth enrolled in university age 18-23  
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Full sample 
(3) 
Full sample 
(4) 
Urban sample 
(5) 
Black sample 
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University 
enrolment 
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enrolment 
University 
enrolment 
University 
enrolment 
University 
enrolment 
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Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; (Source: NIDS wave 1-4) 

To identify the effect of school quality on earnings, we estimate several earnings functions using OLS in 
Table 8. The dependent variable is log earnings and the control variables include gender, race and age46. The 
variables of interest are years of education, years of education squared and the wealth index of the school 
the young worker went to as a measure of school quality. The information for the school were taken from 
the retrospective question of NIDS that asked which school a respondent last attended. Only the subgroup 
 
46 Even though mincer wage regressions normally assume non-linear returns to age, for the small age-period at hand, 
the assumption of linearity for age seems to be sufficient.  
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of workers aged 20-30 were chosen, since there are concerns around the quality of the merge on school 
names for older cohorts. In addition, since the school quintiles seem to explain the variation in education 
outcomes best in urban settings, the analysis was further limited to this subgroup.  
To quantify the impact of education quality on earnings, it is important to distinguish between the direct 
and indirect effects: the indirect effect allows a student from a better school to reach more years of education 
(as seen in Table 4, 5 and 6), whereas the direct effect is the benefit of after controlling for years of education. 
The channel this would have to work through is higher ability, better writing, math or other skills that can 
be observed by their employer. Lastly there is the potential problem of unobserved household heterogeneity, 
since children that went to richer schools might also have higher ability, richer parents and other unobserved 
factors that are financially remunerated in the labour market. In an attempt to control for this household 
effects, mother and father education are included in the earnings model.  
Column (1) shows that school wealth does have a positive and significant effect on earnings, indicating 
some direct positive effect of quality schooling on earnings. Returns to education seem to be convex given 
the significant and negative coefficient for education and positive and significant coefficient for education 
squared. There seem to be a wage premium for being male, Indian47 and white. Next to observe if there is 
a premium for each year higher quality education received, an interaction term between the school wealth 
index and years of education reached is entered in column (2). Entering this interaction term, the coefficient 
of education squared marginally decreases and the coefficient for the school wealth index turns negative. 
Given the significant and positive interaction term this signals that there is a wage premium for higher 
quality education only when a certain combination of quality and years of education is reached. This is best 
illustrated in a graph as shown in Figure 3. The graph shows the returns of education for low, middle and 
high quality schools. For all schools the returns to education turn positive around 8 years.48 The more years 
a student reached the higher the premium for quality education they received. That means that having matric 
from a high quality school would increase earnings by about 50 percentage points on top of the normal 
returns to education. 
 
47 The particularly large coefficient for the Indian dummy might be explained by the small number of Indian youth in 
the sample.  
48 Given that only 4% of workers in our sample have fewer than 8 years of schooling, the model fit at these lower 
schooling values is not of great practical importance. 
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Table 8: Pooled OLS regression: ln(earnings) of age 21-30 in urban sample  
  
(1) 
Full sample 
(2) 
Full sample 
(3) 
Black sample 
(4) 
Black sample 
VARIABLES Ln(earnings) Ln(earnings) Ln(earnings) Ln(earnings) 
   
ÐË/*$ ' SSS '!!SSS  
 '' ''  
KU,U-G$. ''  ''!  
 '' ''  
Ï&./%& 'SSS 'SSS  
 ' '  
QV$ ''!SSS ''!"SSS ''SSS '' SSS
 '''! 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 ''"' ''" ''" 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Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (Source: NIDS wave 1-4) 

As a robustness check, the same set of specifications are also run only on the black sample. It appears that 
for black youth in urban areas the direct effect of going to a high quality school is even larger than the 
overall average. This is demonstrated in Figure 4 that has even larger returns to high levels of education for 
black workers that go to the highest quality schools. 
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Figure 3: Returns to education given different school quality  

(Source: own calculation from earnings regression seen in Table 8) 


Figure 4: Returns to education given different school quality for black youth  

(Source: own calculation from earnings regression seen in Table 8) 



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4.5. Conclusion 
This paper evaluated the relative importance of family, neighbourhood and school quality in explaining the 
variation in school and labour market outcomes for South Africa. To do so, the Census 2011 community 
data was used to develop a new wealth index for about 85,000 neighbourhoods that can be linked to school 
and student location from the National Income Dynamics Study. Revised school wealth quintiles were 
estimated. They prove to be good measures for school quality and are more accurate than the previously 
used school quintiles in explaining schooling outcomes, in particular for urban areas. 
The results of this study have shown that children going to the richest 20% of schools in urban areas have 
on average roughly 0.6 more years of education than children going to the poorest 20% of schools. A student 
living in the poorest quintile neighbourhood who attends the richest school in town would perform 
significantly better than a student from the same neighbourhood who is going to the poorest school. Sadly, 
due to financial and transport constraints only 10% of children living in the poorest 60% neighbourhoods 
are manging to go to the richest school quintile. Hence, the study provides further evidence of how 
segregated the South African school system is: providing quality education to a few and leaving behind a 
large share of poor children. It highlights the importance bringing high quality schooling into the townships 
and rural areas where a majority of the poor live. This chapter is amongst the first studies to provide evidence 
of the importance of quality education in explaining who is enrolling in university (after reaching matric) 
and determining subsequent earnings. Both of these outcomes are of great concern for decreasing inequality 
in South Africa. From the earnings model it can be concluded that there are increasing returns to education 
for going to a high quality school. This means that children receive a 50% premium for receiving matric 
from a high quality school in comparison to a child with matric from a low quality school.  
This study has shown that the revised school wealth quintiles are an important means of identifying schools 
that need special attention, since it predicts individual learner and school outcomes more accurately than 
the official school quintiles. Such an instrument could also be used by the department of education to target 
poor schools and reform a funding system to achieve more equal school outcomes in South Africa in the 
long run. Moving children from the poorest schools to the richest quintile schools have shown large 
significant effects. Hence, finding mechanisms to ensure that all children have access to high quality schools 
– whether through vouchers, bussing or massively improving the schools in the townships and rural areas 
– is an important step towards equalising education opportunity in South Africa. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusion 
 
Viewed broadly, this thesis aims to measure economic and social mobility in South Africa. It has been shown 
that various problems with survey responses can produce misleading impression of the South African labour 
market and of income dynamics. This highlights the importance of measuring variables of interest accurately 
and to carefully consider the ways in which unreliable responses can bias the results of conventional 
estimators. It was demonstrated that even the most appropriate estimator and identification strategy can fail 
to yield unbiased estimates if important measurement issues are ignored. To address these shortcomings 
new approaches remedy well-known survey data reliability concerns have been applied and adapted in this 
thesis. In the following, the most important findings of the three chapters are outlined and based on these 
findings, we proceed to discuss a few policy recommendations and further needed research.

5.1. Findings from chapter 2 
Given the scope and scale of the youth unemployment problem in South Africa, estimating labour market 
behaviour and understanding the school to work transition is of the utmost importance. Previous studies 
that have looked at the direct effect of reservation wages on employment probability haven’t found any 
adverse effects. However, answers to the traditional question on reservation wages may fail to provide 
meaningful answers. Chapter 2 has revisited this issue by comparing the answers to the traditional 
reservation wage question to a series of questions intended to elicit a more accurate response to questions 
asking the respondent about the lowest wage for which he or she would work. The results presented in 
chapter 2 have shown that the survey design and wording of questions matter for reliable reservation wage 
measurement. In line with findings in psychology and behavioural economics, we find that different 
formulations and ordering of the reservation wage question can trigger different cognitive processes in the 
respondent that elicit different answers. Interestingly, youth that have little or no job experience and are not 
attached to the labour market appear to be the most sensitive to such framing and priming effects. This is 
expected given that they have had little labour market exposure and experience to shape their expectations 
and the observed fluctuations may thus be due to a greater deal of uncertainty about their own perceptions.  
On the other hand, the new probed reservation wage measure seems to be more internally consistent and 
the regression results to be in line with labour market search models. That is, using the probed measure we 
find significant positive effects of transportation costs and household wealth, as well as household income 
on reservation wages. Having a unique panel of young job-seekers we can also show a significant negative 
correlation with unemployment duration. This result is in line with the international literature and it is a 
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novel finding for South Africa. In conclusion, this chapter has shown that in the context of high 
unemployment and weak labour market attachment which characterise the reality for many South African 
youth, approaches commonly used in developed countries cannot be applied in a high unemployment 
context without more research, including experimenting with a variety of question formulations that trigger 
distinct cognitive processes to gauge whether these provide consistent responses. 

5.2. Findings from chapter 3 
Upward economic mobility continues to be one of the most important indicators for economic 
development and also the equity of a society. However, the results of this chapter have shown that 
estimating the speed of convergence between the poorest and richest households using micro growth 
regressions without controlling for measurement error would overestimate income mobility significantly. 
Therefore, a newly developed GMM estimator was applied to four large national panel studies to obtain less 
biased β estimates. The findings of four large representative national panel studies from the USA, South 
Africa, Chile and Tanzania show that naïve OLS regression coefficients would overestimate the extent of 
income mobility by a factor of about 4-6. Translating the GMM β coefficient for the US into the expected 
half-life of income gaps shows that the estimates are in line with the intergenerational literature which are 
less vulnerable to measurement error. In addition, the J-statistic indicates that the GMM estimator can 
calculate all linearly independent regression coefficients in a way that is internally highly consistent. The 
results provide support for the assumption that the GMM estimator produces realistic estimates for the 
speed of convergence within a country. The hypothesis of no measurement error can be rejected for all the 
countries observed and the α estimates imply that the share of income variation that is due to actual income 
changes is only 55% for Tanzania, 63% for Chile, 79% for the USA and 80% for South Africa. Therefore, 
while the data reliability for the US, Chile and Tanzania correspond to their levels of economic development, 
South Africa’s data reliability appears to be unexpectedly high. The nonparametric estimates also show that 
the speed of convergence varies over the income distribution and that income is more reliably captured for 
richer than for poorer households. This research cautions against the overestimation of income mobility 
when not accounting for measurement error, which is relevant for all concerned with reliably capturing the 
extent of upward mobility including policy makers. 
 
5.3. Findings from chapter 4 
Chapter 4 tried to evaluate the relative importance of family, neighbourhood and school quality in explaining 
socio-economic outcomes for South Africa. While previous studies in the US and Northern Europe, mostly 
found only small neighbourhood or school effects, location and schooling quality should matter more in 
South Africa, where movement was restricted and resources were distributed unevenly between the different 
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school systems of the past. Using spatial merging techniques to combine different data sets, new school 
wealth quintiles have been created that predict individual learner and school outcomes more accurately than 
the old school quintiles. The results of this chapter have shown how children going to the richest 20% of 
schools reach significant more years of education than children going to the poorest 20% of schools. 
However, this study also demonstrates that even children from the poorest neighbourhood would perform 
well if they go to one of the richest 20% of schools. Yet, given the limited number of quality schools, the 
segregated location of quality school, financial as well as transport constraints, only about 10% of children 
the poorest 60% actually attend a top quintile schools. In order to achieve more equal and more acceptable 
education outcomes, the quality of schools in the poor neighbourhoods would need to be drastically 
improved. The thesis provides evidence of the importance of quality education in explaining university 
enrolments. In addition, there seem to be a significant premium for quality education in labour markets 
earnings regressions, which show that schooling has an enduring and long-lasting impact. In general, finding 
mechanisms to ensure that poor children have access to high quality schools – whether through vouchers, 
bussing or massively improving the township schools – is a crucial step towards equalising education 
opportunity and creating a post-apartheid society that is more open and fairer. 
 
5.4. Final conclusion 
The overall findings and implications of this thesis are manifold. New available panel data makes it possible 
to answer questions on economic and social mobility in South Africa. Many studies using panel estimators 
have been published in recent years. However, these new panel estimators are vulnerable to measurement 
error: Hence new techniques to control for, and get unbiased results, are important. I.e. Chapter 1 shows 
that the formulation of survey questions can be instrumental in getting unbiased results, in particular in the 
setting of week labour market-attachment.  In future research, an experimental study could be designed to 
estimate the magnitude of the anchoring and miss-reporting in survey responses. The second Chapter shows 
that income mobility estimates using panel estimates are highly sensitive to measurement error. In a next 
step, consequences for other indicators like poverty dynamics, can be observed to show the relevance of 
these results. The final question is: What have we learnt from this thesis about social and income mobility 
in South Africa? Given the current developments in South Africa, this is a very relevant question and its 
answer has important policy relevance. As chapter 2 shows, income convergence in South Africa is slower 
than in other developing countries. The time half the income gaps between any two households in the 
country should be eliminated within 23 years, or equivalent to another generation. This thesis can identify 
at least two reasons for this slow convergence: Firstly, there is the severe youth unemployment problem 
resulting from a mismatch between a shortage in qualified job entries and the demand for high paying jobs. 
In this situation, financial household support or and unreasonably high wage expectations due to week 
labour market attachment, might further increase the unemployment duration of the youth. Secondly, as 
demonstrated in chapter 3, South Africa has a highly unequal school system, of which the outcomes are still 
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very much dependent on birthplace and parental background. Hence, to improve social mobility and 
decrease income inequality, improving the quality of schools in poor neighbourhoods and regions is highly 
recommended. Other options might be vocational training or other forms of skills transfer to improve the 
chances of youths on the labour market, especially those from poor backgrounds.The current major student 
protests about issues regarding free quality education may offer an opportunity to reach the public and 
convince the government to make the necessary transformation. 
 
 
 
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Bibliography 
AGUIRREGABIRIA, V., MIRA, P., (2010). Dynamic Discrete Choice Structural Models: A Survey. Journal of 
Econometric, 156(1), 38-67. 
Abel, M. (2013). Unintended labour supply effects of cash transfer programs: Evidence from South Africa’s 
old age pension. SALDRU working paper Number 114, UCT. 
Abowd, J. M., & Stinson, M. H. (2013). Estimating measurement error in annual job earnings: A comparison 
of survey and administrative data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(5), 1451-1467.  
Addison, J. T., Centeno, M., & Portugal, P. (2004). Reservation wages, search duration, and accepted wages 
in Europe. IZA Discussion Papers 350, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). 
Addison, J. T., Centeno, M., & Portugal, P. (2009). Do reservation wages really decline? Some international 
evidence on the determinants of reservation wages. Journal of labor research, 30(1), 1-8. 
Addison, J. T., Centeno, M., & Portugal, P. (2010). Unemployment Benefits and Reservation Wages: Key 
Elasticities from a Stripped(Down Job Search Approach. Economica, 77(305), 46-59.  
Addison, J., Machado, J., & Portugal, P. (2013). The Reservation Wage Unemployment Duration Nexus. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 75(6), 980–987. 
Agüero, J., Carter, M. R., & May, J. (2007). Poverty and inequality in the first decade of South Africa's 
democracy: What can be learnt from panel data from KwaZulu-Natal? Journal of African Economies, 16(5), 
782-812.  
Akee, R. (2011). Errors in self-reported earnings: The role of previous earnings volatility and individual 
characteristics. Journal of Development Economics, 96(2), 409-421.  
Allanson, P., Atkins, J. P., & Hinks, T. (2002). No end to the racial wage hierarchy in South Africa?. Review 
of Development Economics, 6(3), 442-459. 
Altonji, J. G., & Mansfield, R. K. (2011). The role of family, school, and community characteristics in 
inequality in education and labor market outcomes. Whither opportunity, 339-358. 
Antman, F., & McKenzie, D. (2007a). Poverty traps and nonlinear income dynamics with measurement 
error and individual heterogeneity. The journal of development studies, 43(6), 1057-1083. 
Ardington, C., Case, A. & Hosegood, V. (2009). Labor supply responses to large social transfers: 
Longitudinal evidence from South Africa. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1), 22–48. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Ardington, C., Bärnighausen, T., Case, A., & Menendez, A. (2016). Social protection and labor market 
outcomes of youth in South Africa. ILR Review, 69(2), 455-470. 
Banerjee, A., Galiani, S., Levinsohn, J., McLaren, Z., & Woolard, I. (2008). Why has unemployment risen 
in the new South Africa? 1. Economics of Transition, 16(4), 715-740. 
Barro, R. J., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992). Convergence. Journal of Political Economy, 223-251.  
Barro, R. J., & Sala-i-Martin, X. (2004). Economic Growth (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Baulch, B., & Hoddinott, J. (2000). Economic mobility and poverty dynamics in developing countries. The 
Journal of Development Studies, 36(6), 1-24. 
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001). Do people mean what they say? Implications for subjective survey 
data. American Economic Review, 67-72. 
Bertrand, M., Mullainathan, S., & Miller, D. (2003). Public policy and extended families: Evidence from 
pensions in South Africa. The World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 27-50. 
Bingley, P., & Martinello, A. (2014). Measurement error in income and schooling, and the bias of linear 
estimators. 
Björklund A, Jäntti M, Raaum O, Österbacka E, Eriksson T (2004). Family structure and labor market 
success: the influence of siblings and birth order on the earnings of young adults in Norway, Finland, 
and Sweden. In: Corak M (ed) Generational mobility in North America and Europe. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, pp 208–225. 
Bloemen, H. G., & Stancanelli, E. G. (2001). Individual wealth, reservation wages, and transitions into 
employment. Journal of Labor Economics, 19(2), 400-439. 
Böheim, R. (2002). The association between reported and calculated reservation wages. ISER Working 
Paper Series, No. 2002-07. 
Bound, J., Brown, C., & Mathiowetz, N. (2001). Measurement Error in Survey Data. In J. J. Heckman & E. 
Leamer (Eds.), Handbook of Econometrics, Vol 5. New York: Elsevier Science B.V. 
Bound, J., & Krueger, A. B. (1991). The Extent of Measurement Error in Longitudinal Earnings Data: Do 
Two Wrongs Make a Right? Journal of Labor Economics, 1-24.  
Booysen, F., van der Berg, S., Burger, R., Maltitz, M. V., & Rand, G. D. (2008). Using an asset index to 
assess trends in poverty in seven Sub-Saharan African countries. World Development, 36(6), 1113-1130. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Branson, N., Hofmeyr, C., & Lam, D. (2014). Progress through school and the determinants of school 
dropout in South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 31(1), 106-126. 
Brown, M., Flinn, C.J., & Schotter, A. (2011). Real-Time Search in the Laboratory and the Market. American 
Economic Review, 101, 948–974. 
Brown, S., & Taylor, K. (2011). Reservation wages, market wages and unemployment: Analysis of individual 
level panel data. Economic Modelling, 28(3), 1317-1327.  
Brown, S., & Taylor, K. (2013). Reservation wages, expected wages and unemployment. Economics Letters, 
119(3), 276-279. 
Branson, N., & Wittenberg, M. (2007). The measurement of employment status in South Africa using 
cohort analysis, 1994(2004. South African Journal of Economics, 75(2), 313-326. 
Burdett, K., & Vishwanath, T. (1988). Declining Reservation Wages and Learning. Review of Economic Studies, 
55, 655–665. 
Burger, R., van der Berg, S., & Fintel, D. (2015). The unintended consequences of education policies on 
South African participation and unemployment. South African Journal of Economics, 83(1), 74-100. 
Burger, R., Steenekamp, C. L., van der Berg, S., & Zoch, A. (2015). The emergent middle class in 
contemporary South Africa: Examining and comparing rival approaches. Development Southern Africa, 
32(1), 25-40. 
Card, D., & Krueger, A. (1990). Does school quality matter? Returns to education and the characteristics 
of public schools in the United States (No. w3358). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Case, A., & Deaton, A. (1999). School inputs and educational outcomes in South Africa. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 1047-1084. 
Case, A., & Yogo, M. (1999). Does school quality matter? Returns to education and the characteristics of 
schools in South Africa (No. w7399). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Cruces, G., Fields, G., & Viollaz, M. (2013). Can the limitations of Panel datasets be overcome by using 
Pseudo-panels to estimate income mobility. Technical report, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La 
Plata. 
Cuesta, J., Ñopo, H., & Pizzolitto, G. (2011). Using Pseudo(Panels To Measure Income Mobility In Latin 
America. Review of Income and Wealth, 57(2), 224-246.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


De Kadt, J., Norris, S. A., Fleisch, B., Richter, L., & Alvanides, S. (2014). Children's daily travel to school 
in Johannesburg-Soweto, South Africa: geography and school choice in the Birth to Twenty cohort 
study. Children's Geographies, 12(2), 170-188. 
Dercon, S. & Krishnan, P. 2000. Vulnerability, Seasonality and Poverty in Ethiopia. The Journal of Development 
Studies, 36(6): 25-53. 
Du Rand, G., van Broekhuizen, H., & von Fintel, D. (2011). The Role of Levels of Numeric Competence 
and School Quality in the South African Wage Function. 
Duflo, E. (2003). Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old(Age Pensions and Intrahousehold Allocation in 
South Africa. The World Bank Economic Review, 17(1), 1-25. 
Eriksson T, & Zhang, Y. (2012). The role of family background for earnings in rural China. Front Econ 
China, 7(3):465–477. 
Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Zehnder, C. (2006). Fairness perceptions and reservation wages—the behavioral effects 
of minimum wage laws. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(4), 1347-1381. 
Feldstein, M., & Poterba, J. (1984). Unemployment insurance and reservation wages. Journal of Public 
Economics, 23(1), 141-167. 
Fields, G. S. (2008a). A brief review of the literature on earnings mobility in developing countries ILR 
Working Paper 2-20-2008. Ithaca: Cornell University. 
Fields, G. S. (2008b). Income mobility. In L. Blume & S. N. Durlauf (Eds.), The new Palgrave dictionary 
of economics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Fields, G. S., Cichello, P. L., Freije, S., Menéndez, M., & Newhouse, D. (2003a). For richer or for poorer? 
Evidence from Indonesia, South Africa, Spain, and Venezuela. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 1(1), 67-
99.  
Fields, G. S., Cichello, P. L., Freije, S., Menéndez, M., & Newhouse, D. (2003b). Household income 
dynamics: a four-country story. The journal of development studies, 40(2), 30-54.  
Fields, G. S., Duval-Hernández, R., Freije, S., & Puerta, M. L. S. (2014). Earnings mobility, inequality, and 
economic growth in Argentina, Mexico, and Venezuela. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 1-26.  
Fields, G. S., & Viollaz, M. (2013). Can the Limitations of Panel Datasets be Overcome by Using Pseudo-
Panels to Estimate Income Mobility? Universidad Cornell-CEDLAS.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Finn, A., Leibbrandt, M., & Levinsohn, J. (2012). Income mobility in South Africa: Evidence from the first 
two waves of the National Income Dynamics Study. Southern Africa Labour and Development Research 
Unit, University of Cape Town. 
Glewwe, P., & Kremer, M. (2006). Schools, teachers, and education outcomes in developing countries. 
Handbook of the Economics of Education, 2, 945-1017. 
Glewwe, P. (2012). How much of observed economic mobility is measurement error? IV methods to reduce 
measurement error bias, with an application to Vietnam. The World Bank Economic Review, 26(2), 236-264.  
Gottschalk, P., & Huynh, M. (2010). Are earnings inequality and mobility overstated? The impact of 
nonclassical measurement error. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(2), 302-315.  
Hanushek, E. A., Lavy, V., & Hitomi, K. (2008). Do students care about school quality? Developing 
countries. Journal of Human Capital, 2(1),69–105. 
Harbison, R. W., & Hanushek, E. A. (1992). Educational performance of the poor: Lessons from rural 
northeast Brazil. Oxford University Press. 
Hill, L. D. (2016). Race, school choice and transfers to opportunity: implications for educational 
stratification in South Africa. British Journal of Sociology of Education, 37(4), 520-547. 
Hofler, R. A., & Murphy, K. J. (1994). Estimating reservation wages of employed workers using a stochastic 
frontier. Southern Economic Journal, 961-976. 
Holzer, H. J. (1986a). Reservation wages and their labor market effects for black and white male youth. 
Journal of Human Resources, 157-177. 
Holzer, H. J. (1986b). Black youth nonemployment: Duration and job search. In The black youth 
employment crisis (pp. 23-73). University of Chicago Press. 
Hunter, M. (2015). Schooling choice in South Africa: The limits of qualifications and the politics of race, 
class and symbolic power. International Journal of Educational Development, 43, 41-50. 
Jäntti, M., & Jenkins, S. P. (2015). Chapter 10 - Income Mobility. In B. A. Anthony & B. François (Eds.), 
Handbook of Income Distribution (Vol. Volume 2, pp. 807-935): Elsevier. 
Jarvis, S., & Jenkins, S. (1998). How much income mobility is there in Britain? The Economic Journal, 108(447), 
428-443.  
Jensen, P., & Westergård-Nielsen, N. C. (1987). A search model applied to the transition from education to 
work. The Review of Economic Studies, 54(3), 461-472.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Jones, Stephen R G, (1988). The Relationship between Unemployment Spells and Reservation Wages as a 
Test of Search Theory. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, 103(4), pp. 741-65. 
Kingdon, G., & Knight, J. (2001). What have we learnt about unemployment from microdatasets in South 
Africa?. Social Dynamics, 27(1), 79-95. 
Kingdon, G., & Knight, J. (2004). Unemployment in South Africa: The nature of the beast. World 
Development, 32(3), 391-408. 
Klasen, S., & Woolard, I. (2009). Surviving unemployment without state support: unemployment and 
household formation in South Africa. Journal of African economies, 18(1), 1-51. 
Kriechel, B., & Pfann, G. A. (2006). Learning to update your reservation wage while looking for a new job. 
Portuguese Economic Journal, 5(2), 135-148. 
Krueger, A., & Mueller, A. (2014). A Contribution to the Empirics of Reservation Wages (No. w19870). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Lam, D., Leibbrandt, M. & Mlatsheni, C., (2008). Education and Youth Unemployment. SALDRU Working 
Paper, UCT. 
Lam, D., Leibbrandt, M., & Mlatsheni, C. (2010). Human capital, job search, and unemployment among 
young people in South Africa. Paper presented at 2010 meeting of Population Association of America, 
Dallas, TX. 
Lam, D., Ardington, C., & Leibbrandt, M. (2011). Schooling as a lottery: Racial differences in school 
advancement in urban South Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 95(2), 121-136. 
Lam, D., Ardington, C., Branson, N., Case, A., Leibbrandt, M., Maughan-Brown, B., Menendez, A., 
Seekings, J., Sparks, M (2013). The Cape Area Panel Study - Overview and Technical Documentation 
Waves 1-2-3-4-5 (2002-2009). UCT. 
Lancaster, T. (1985). Simultaneous equations models in applied search theory, Journal of Econometrics, 28, 
113–126. 
Lancaster, T., & Chesher, A. (1983). An econometric analysis of reservation wages. Econometrica: Journal of 
the Econometric Society, 1661-1676. 
Lechtenfeld, T., & Zoch, A. (2014). Income Convergence in South Africa: Fact or Measurement Error? 
Lee, N. (2009). Measurement error and its impact on estimates of income and consumption dynamics. 
Available at SSRN 1299330.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
	

Leibbrandt, M., Lilenstein, K., Shenker, C., & Woolard, I. (2013). The influence of social transfers on labour 
supply: A South African and international review. SALDRU working paper 2013-10. 
Lindahl, L. (2011). A comparison of family and neighborhood effects on grades, test scores, educational 
attainment and income—evidence from Sweden. The Journal of Economic Inequality, 9(2), 207-226. 
Msila, V. (2005). The education exodus: The flight from township schools. Africa Education Review, 2 (2): 
173–188. 
Mortensen, D. (1976). Unemployment insurance and job search decisions. Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev., 30, 505. 
Mortensen, D. (1986) Job Search and Labor Market Analysis, in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.) 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 2, North-Holland. 
Moylan, S., Millar, J., & Davies, R. (1984). For richer, for poorer?: DHSS cohort study of unemployed men. 
HM Stationery Office. 
Nattrass, N. (2002). Unemployment, employment and labour force participation in Khayelitsha/Mitchell's 
Plain. CSSR Working Paper, 133. 
Nattrass, N., & Walker, R. (2005). Unemployment and reservation wages in working-class Cape Town. South 
African Journal of Economics, 73(3), 498-509. 
Newhouse, D. (2005). The persistence of income shocks: Evidence from rural Indonesia. Review of 
development Economics, 9(3), 415-433.  
Nicoletti, C., & Rabe, B. (2013). Inequality in Pupils' Test Scores: How Much do Family, Sibling Type and 
Neighbourhood Matter?. Economica, 80(318), 197-218. 
Orthofer A. (2016). Wealth Inequality in South Africa: Insights from Survey and Tax Data. REDI3x3 
Working Paper 15. 
Petterson, S. (1997). Are young Black men really less willing to work?. American Sociological Review, 605-613. 
Pissarides, C. (2000) Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, Second Edition. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Posel, D., Fairburn, J. A., & Lund, F. (2006). Labour migration and households: A reconsideration of the 
effects of the social pension on labour supply in South Africa. Economic modelling, 23(5), 836-853. 
Raaum, O., Salvanes, K. G., & Sørensen, E. Ø. (2006). The neighbourhood is not what it used to be*. The 
Economic Journal, 116(508), 200-222. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 



Ranchhod, V. (2006). The effect of the South African old age pension on labour supply of the elderly. South 
African Journal of Economics, 74(4), 725-744. 
Rankin, N. A., & Roberts, G. (2011). Youth unemployment, firm size and reservation wages in South Africa. 
South African Journal of Economics, 79(2), 128-145. 
Ravallion, M. (2010). The developing world’s bulging (but vulnerable) middle class. World Development, 38(4), 
445-454. 
Reddy, V. (2012). Towards Equity and Excellence: Highlights from TIMSS 2011. The south african 
perspective. 
Schnitzlein, D. D. (2014). How important is the family? Evidence from sibling correlations in permanent 
earnings in the USA, Germany, and Denmark. Journal of Population Economics, 27(1), 69-89. 
Sestito, P. & Viviano, E. (2011). Reservation Wages: Explaining Some Puzzling Regional Patterns. Labour, 
25 (1), 63–88. 
Sienaert, A. (2008). The Labour Supply Effects of the South African State Old Age Pension: Theory, 
Evidence and Implications. A SALDRU Working Paper 20, Cape Town. 
Shimer, R., & Werning, I. (2007). Reservation wages and unemployment insurance. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 122(3), 1145-1185. 
Solon, G., Page, M. E., & Duncan, G. J. (2000). Correlations between neighboring children in their 
subsequent educational attainment. Review of Economics and Statistics, 82(3), 383-392. 
Solon, G. (1999). Intergenerational mobility in the labor market. Handbook of labor economics, 3, 1761-
1800. 
Solon, G. (2002). Cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings mobility. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 16(3), 59-66. 
Spaull, N., & Kotze, J. (2015). Starting behind and staying behind in South Africa: The case of 
insurmountable learning deficits in mathematics. International Journal of Educational Development, 41, 
13-24. 
Statistics South Africa, (2012a). Census 2011 Metadata. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria. 
Statistics South Africa, (2012b). Census 2011 Statistical release – P0301.4. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria. 
Statistics South Africa, (2014). The South African MPI: Creating a multidimensional poverty index using 
census data. Statistics South Africa. Pretoria.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
	

Taylor, N., van der Berg, S., & Mabogoane, T. (Eds.). (2013). Creating effective schools. Cape Town: 
Pearson. 
Taylor, S., van der Berg, S., Reddy, V., & Janse van Rensburg, D. (2011). How well do South African schools 
convert grade 8 achievement into matric outcomes? (No. 13/2011). Stellenbosch University, 
Department of Economics. 
Van der Berg, S., Burger, R., Burger, R., Louw, M., & Yu, D. (2005). Trends in poverty and inequality since 
the political transition. Stellenbosch Working Paper 1/2005. Stellenbosch University, Department of 
Economics. 
Van der Berg, S., Burger, C., Burger, R., de Vos, M., du Rand, G., Gustafsson, M., ... & van Broekhuizen, 
H. (2011). Low quality education as a poverty trap. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. 
Van der Berg, S. (2007). Apartheid's enduring legacy: Inequalities in education. Journal of African Economies, 
16(5), 849-880. 
Van der Berg, S. (2008). How effective are poor schools? Poverty and educational outcomes in South Africa. 
Studies in Educational Evaluation, 34(3), 145-154. 
Van der Berg, S. (2009). The persistence of inequalities in education. In B. Kahn & G. Kingdon (Eds.), 
South African economic policy under democracy (pp. 327–354). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Van Wyk, C. (2015). An overview of education data in South Africa: An inventory approach'. South African 
Journal of Childhood Education (Forthcoming). 
Von Fintel, D. (2007). Dealing with Earnings Bracket Responses in Household Surveys–How Sharp are 
Midpoint Imputations?. South African Journal of Economics, 75(2), 293-312. 
Yamauchi, F. (2011). School quality, clustering and government subsidy in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Economics of Education Review, 30(1), 146-156. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MA: MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Woolard, I., & Klasen, S. (2005). Determinants of income mobility and household poverty dynamics in 
South Africa. Journal of Development Studies, 41(5), 865-897.  
World Bank (2012). South Africa, Focus on Inequality of Opportunity. Economic Update: 71553. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 


Appendix A:  
Additional Tables (Chapter 2) 

Table A.1: Number of observations and youth characteristics in CAPS 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave5 
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Note: Descriptive statistics use sample weights. The weighted distributions are within two percentage point of the 
population group distribution in Cape Town in the 1996 Census (see Lam et al., 2013). Due to the small number of 
observations from the Indian population (11), this group was omitted from the analysis. (Source: CAPS wave 1-5) 
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Attrition pattern for CAPS wave 2-5 
Frequency Percent Wave observed 
  2 3 4 5 
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(Source: CAPS wave 2-5) 
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Table A.3: List of hypothetical job offers in CAPS 
Job description Rand amount (in 2002 value) Wave 
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(Source: CAPS wave 2-5) 

Table A.4: Reason for stopping last job 
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(Source: CAPS wave 4) 

 
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Table A.5: Interval regression  
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES model lnsigma 
  
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Not reported wave and location dummies. (Source: CAPS wave 2-5) 
 


 
McFadden's R2:                 0.129     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.129
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(11819):                4857324.281     LR(30):                   721086.366
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -2.789e+06     Log-Lik Full Model:       -2.429e+06
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Table A.6: Effects of reservation wages  
 (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE FE FD FD OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES 
Employed Employed ∆Employed ∆Employed 
Transitioned 
into 
employment 
Transitioned 
out of 
employment 
Quit 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Also controlled for years of schooling, experience and wave dummies. (Source: CAPS wave 2-5) 
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Appendix B:  
Additional Tables (Chapter 3) 

Table B.1: Regression coefficients for South African income regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Source: NIDS wave 1-3) 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2: Regression coefficients for Chile income regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
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^(_-%G$. '! '  ''' ' " ' ! ''" ''
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Source: EPC wave 1-3) 
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Table B.3: Regression coefficients for Tanzania income regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS estimation of ¥O - ¥´ IV 
estimation 
µb µb µb b  b µb µb 
b ('SSS  ('' ('SSS 'SSS  
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''"" 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*%&* SSS " SSS '!S  'SSS  SSS ''SSS '!'S
' ' '' ' ' ''" '
$G+%*/U& D" D" D    D" D    D    D   
^(_-%G$. '" ' ''' ''! ' '  ''"
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(Source: NPS wave 1-3) 
 
 
Table B.4: Robustness analysis GMM estimates for South African 
 G/V/&%,%[W,$
Ð%+$YYË$%.X%&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''  
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Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source (NIDS wave 1-3) 
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Appendix C:  
Additional Figures and Tables (Chapter 4) 
 
Table C.1: Variables used to generate the wealth index using PCA  
Category Variables 
Labour market status:  
 
Employed, unemployed, discouraged work seeker, not economically active 
Education: 
 
No education, some primary education, secondary education, matric, 
higher/further education 
Household income: No income, low income (1 – 38200 rand) , middle income (38201 - 153800 
rand), high income (153800 – 2457601 rand or more), Unspecified 
Household assets: Cell phone, computer, motor car, refrigerator, satellite TV, stove, TV, washing 
machine 
Household services: Water source –regional water scheme,  
Waste removal –local authority weekly, 
Internet access - from home; from cell phone; from work, from elsewhere; no 
access to internet, 
Toilet: flush toilet; flush toilet septic tank 
 
Household size: Household size 1 - Household size 10+ 
(Source: Census 2011) 
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Figure C.1: Example of SP and SAL maps in metropolitan Cape Town  
 
 
Note: The first map on top shows SP and the second map at the bottom the SAL layers. (Source: Census 2011 data) 


Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
)

Figure C.2: Kernel density of PCA wealth index  
 
(Source: Census 2011) 

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Figure C.3: Neighbourhood wealth quintiles, geographic school distribution and matric 2014 examination results in 
Cape Town metropolitan municipality  
Note: In the first map the entire geographic distribution of primary and secondary schools is shown. In the second 
map the average matric 2014 examination results per school are displayed.  
(Source: Census 2011 and DBE school data) 
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Figure C.4: Neighbourhood wealth quintiles, geographic school distribution and matric 2014 examination results in 
Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni metropolitan municipalities  
 
 
Note: In the first map the entire geographic distribution of primary and secondary schools is shown. In the second map 
the average matric 2014 examination results per school are displayed. (Source: Census 2011 and DBE school data) 
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Figure C.5: Neighbourhood wealth quintiles, geographic race distribution and matric 2014 examination results in 
eThekwini metropolitan municipality  
Note: The colours in the bottom map indicate a share larger than 50% for a particular race group in that SAL in the 
Census 2011 data. In addition, the average matric 2014 examination results per school are displayed. 
(Source: Census 2011 and DBE school data). 

 
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Table C.2: Difference in school and learner neighbourhood wealth quintiles  
 
 
Western 
Cape 
Eastern 
Cape 
ÊXËUU,
H$%,*Ë
_-/&*/,$
Ì
*-.$&*
H$%,*Ë
_-/&*/,$
      'Í
(  '!'Í  '! Í
( ! '!'Í '  'Í
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(Source: NIDS and Census 2011) 
 
 
Table C.3: OLS regression – Difference in school and learner neighbourhood wealth quintiles  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Difference school and neighbourhood 
quintiles 
   
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 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 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 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   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^(_-%G$. '  '  ''
Not reportedprovince dummies (Source: NIDS wave 1-3)  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 
))

Table C4 and Table C5 provide the average distance to school for each student in NIDS. The columns to 
the left provide the values for the new school distance variable which were obtained from the matching 
process of NIDS with the master lists of schools using fuzzy matching on school name and location. Given 
the significant differences to the match provided in the NIDS data (distance to school NIDS), in all the 
analysis of this chapter only the school information for wave 1-3 from the own matching was used. 
Table C.4: Distance to school  
   Distance to school new Distance to school from NIDS 
   km Std. Number km Std. Number 
Ê$XU&.%G\
%V$
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%&
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(Source: NIDS wave 1-4) 
 
Table C.5: Distance to school  
   Distance to school new Distance to school from NIDS 
  Year km Std. Number km Std. Number 
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(Source: NIDS wave 1-4) 
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Table C.6: Household characteristics for age 15-18  
 Mean Std. Number 
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Table uses population weights to obtain national representative results (Source: NIDS wave 1-3) 
 
Table C.7: Pooled OLS regression: reached years of education by age 15-18 with DBE quintiles  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
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(Source NIDS wave 1-3) 
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Table C.8: Pooled OLS regression: reached years of education by age 15-18 with additional controls 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
Years of 
education 
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